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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In their classic article, which was actually written in the 1940s but published
in 1954, Friedman & Kuznets (1954) study a data set from a yearly survey
administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the late 1920s and early
1930s. The survey concerned professional men practising their trade indepen-
dently in five professions: engineering, accounting, law, medicine and dentistry.
According to Friedman & Kuznets, their paper is a ”detailed description of the
income structure of [the] five professions”. They study the inequality between
and within each professional group, and how they evolve over time. One of
their particular interests is something they call ”the stability of relative income
status”, or, if the earnings inequality within a profession is mostly permanent
or transitory.
These two types of earnings inequality have different implications for long-
run earnings inequality. Permanent earnings differences imply inequality in the
long run; high income professionals remain high income professionals and low
income professionals remain low income professionals. Transitory inequality,
on the other hand, implies shuﬄing within the earnings distribution; a high
income professional may have low income in the next year, and vice versa.
To disentangle permanent and transitory income differences from one another,
researcher obviously needs a panel data set, where the same people are followed
over consecutive years.
Many of the themes discussed in this thesis were systematically covered for
the first time in Friedman & Kuznets (1954). Their paper is, to my knowledge,
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the first empirical economics paper to utilize panel data in studying earnings
differences between and within groups.1
The analysis in Friedman & Kuznets (1954) might seem rather archaic to
today’s reader. Their analysis was limited by the lack of representative publicly
available datasets and computational power in their disposal. In addition, the
economic and statistical knowledge has significantly cumulated in the last 70
years. Nonetheless, many of the concepts and ideas first presented in their
paper are still present in modern economic literature, including this doctoral
thesis.
This thesis consists of three independent essays all related to earnings in-
equality and uncertainty. Chapter 2 is a descendant of Friedman & Kuznets
(1954). It studies the earnings structure of two broad groups: working Finnish
males and females and decomposes the variance of yearly earnings into two
components, a transitory and a permanent effect. The estimation is done
using a random sample from Finnish census covering years 1988-2007.
Friedman & Kuznets (1954) also compare the means and dispersions of the
income of professionals to that of salaried workers. They find that professional
workers earn substantially more than salaried workers, but they also note that
the professional workers tend to come from aﬄuent families (who can support
their training) and practicing a profession requires long formal training, there-
fore ”innate ability” of professionals may be higher than the innate ability of
salaried workers. Based on this observation, they speculate that professionals
might have earned more than average salaried workers even if they had de-
cided not to pursue a profession. This is a classic example of selection bias
(Heckman, 1979; Willis & Rosen, 1979).
Selection also affects the estimation of earnings uncertainty of different
career choices. In particular, if people know their innate ability but the re-
searcher does not have a sufficient measure for it, earnings variance of a certain
profession group will overstate the uncertainty of that career. Chapters 3 and 4
of this thesis also provide estimates for monetary returns and uncertainty for a
particular career choice, namely education, corrected for selection. In chapter
3, the main interest is returns to completing a degree and related uncertainty,
whereas chapter 4 studies returns to university majors and their uncertainty.
1Milton Friedman was later awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
partly for his work on how transitory income shocks translate to changes in consumption
(see Friedman 1957).
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1.2 Finnish registry data
All of the chapters of this thesis are empirical and they employ Finnish registry
data. The main strength Finnish registry based data is its high quality. In
particular, the earnings and income measures are calculated from filed tax
reports so measurement errors due to misreporting are arguably very small.
The downside of using income data derived from tax registries is that tax
reports do not have any information on hours worked, which forces me to
limit my attention to yearly income measure. All of the chapters in this thesis
employ random samples of the true underlying population of all Finns, which
ensures that the results can be reliably generalized to Finnish population.
The measure used in chapter 2 is annual labor earnings. This measure
includes income from paid employment, but does not include income from
entrepreneurship. The measure used in chapters 3 and 4 is the total income
subject to taxation, which includes the the income from paid employment,
taxable social security transfers, and entrepreneurial income. Neither of the
two income concepts include income from capital goods.
To limit the attention to people who are a part of the workforce, I use
the ”main type of economic activity” indicator of individuals to classify them.
The main type of activity of individuals is inferred by Statistics Finland by
combining information from various registries. To be a part of the workforce,
an individual has had to be either employed or unemployed for at least 6
months during a year, but it is entirely possible that people who are classified
as ”working” have faced spells of unemployment, or, vice versa, people who are
classified as ”unemployed” have done some work over the year.2
It might be possible, that large negative income shocks might force some
people out of the workforce to be stay-at-home parents or students, which
leads to a particular type of a selection problem. The wages of non-workers
are virtually impossible to observe! This issue is present in some form or
another in all of the chapters of this thesis, and, indeed, in a large part of
the contemporary empirical labour economics literature. Nonetheless, since
the unemployment benefits and most other income transfers are taxable, they
are also observed in the data. Using an income measure which includes these
income transfers arguably gives a more complete view on the income inequality
2For more information, see http://www.stat.fi/til/tyokay/kas_en.html (down-
loaded 2014-01-08).
3
and income risks prevalent in the society.
Most of the existing papers studying either of the above mentioned themes
concentrate on working males and disregard females entirely. The underlying
assumption is that the labour force participation of men is more or less constant
whereas the labour force participation of women is jointly determined with
other family decisions (e.g., fertility), which may, in turn, cause problems for
the estimation. I depart from previous literature in all of the subsequent
chapters of this thesis by estimating separate models for men and women.
Since the labour force participation of women is very high in Finland, I see
that calculating comparable measures for males and females is reasonable.
1.3 Permanent and transitory income differences
1.3.1 Related literature
Income inequality has grown in most of the industrialized countries since the
1970s. This has generated a demand for research which tries to describe the
phenomenon and understand its underlying causes. A particular strand of this
literature are studies on earnings dynamics, which decompose the distribution
of earnings into their permanent and transitory components. This approach
is also taken in chapter 2 of this thesis. I study the annual variance of earn-
ings, decompose it into permanent and transitory components and study their
evolution over time.
The two earnings components have different underlying causes. Permanent
earnings differences are usually attributed to fixed worker attributes such as
education, and skills which are relatively constant from the point of view of
an individual. Transitory shocks, on the other hand, imply more volatile earn-
ings and, consequently, shuﬄing of individuals and are typically attributed to
worker turnover and other macroeconomic factors.
The two components may also have different implications for public pol-
icy. If a policymaker aims to decrease inequality in consumption and earnings
differences are mainly permanent, the policymaker may want to implement
policies which subsidize human capital investments of the most disadvantaged
people. If the transitory shocks are relatively small, people will be able to
smooth their consumption by saving. If, on the other hand, transitory earn-
ings shocks are large or very persistent, the policymaker might want to educate
4
the public about risk-sharing instruments provided by insurance companies,
and credit or stock markets.
Chapter 2 of this thesis is influenced by a series of paper studying the same
question. Early work studying the same concepts and using similar terminol-
ogy is the already mentioned Friedman & Kuznets (1954), but their paper
does not actually quantify the contribution of the permanent and transitory
components. Later, Lillard & Weiss (1979) and Hause (1980) applied the same
conceptual framework to test if the evolution of permanent earnings differences
are consistent with a so-called ”on-the-job training hypothesis”3.
The first papers to plausibly describe the income distribution prevalent in
the society using nationally representative samples include MaCurdy (1982),
Baker (1997), and Haider (2001), all of which use data from the U.S. A similar
decomposition has also been presented, for example, for Canada (Baker &
Solon, 2003), the U.K. (Ramos, 2003) and Italy (Cappellari, 2004).
The focus of aforementioned papers is mostly in describing the key proper-
ties of earnings distribution. More recently they have also been used as building
blocks in macroeconomic models which aim to study how income shocks affect
consumption, savings and wealth accumulation (e.g. Blundell et al. 2008 and
Guvenen & Smith 2010).
1.3.2 Earnings Dynamics of Men and Women in Finland:
Permanent Inequality versus Earnings Instability
Even though there are a multitude of papers fitting variants of the same model,
there are differences in model specifications, data construction and also the
results4. Replicating the analysis using data from a new country is therefore
warranted.
Chapter 2 is a descriptive econometric study on earnings distribution in
Finland. It presents a decomposition of earnings inequality into its perma-
3According to the on-the-job training hypothesis, individuals may accept lower earnings
at the beginning of their career, if they anticipate that their earnings will rise at a high
enough rate and for a long enough time to compensate for low earnings at the beginning of
their career. This implies that the covariance of earnings growth and initial earnings will be
negative (Mincer, 1974).
4As a case in point, Dahl et al. (2011) report that different public use data sets from
the U.S. give quantitatively different results on the evolution of earnings inequality over the
same time period.
5
nent and transitory components and studies their evolution through time and
variation between cohorts.
The model presented is estimated by matching the theoretical moments
implied by an econometric model to those calculated from observed earnings
data. The estimation is done using the Equally Weighted Minimum Distance
Estimation (EWMD) of Chamberlain (1984). Intuitively, the decomposition
is identified using the sample autocorrelation of the earnings of individuals.
For example, if the correlation between two adjacent years’ earnings is found
to be small, this implies that the transitory earnings differences dominate the
permanent. If, instead, there is a high correlation between two adjacent yearly
observations, permanent income inequality will likely dominate the transitory
inequality.
The main result of chapter 2 is that the increasing earnings inequality is
driven by both, permanent and transitory components, but their contribution
is different for men and for women. For men, permanent inequality domi-
nates the transitory inequality. For women, they are of similar magnitude. In
addition, permanent earnings differences vary substantially between cohorts.
Male cohorts are less equal in terms of their permanent earnings compared to
women. There has also been a trend increase in earnings instability of both
sexes during the observation period. Further, accounting for both year and
cohort specific differences in the estimation makes a difference.
The findings presented in chapter 2 suggest that if researchers only con-
centrate on males in their work, they may miss potentially important aspects
of the earnings dynamics prevalent in the labour market.
1.4 Uncertainty in return to education
Monetary returns of education are one of the most widely studied topics¨
in empirical microeconomics5, but the dispersion of these returns has gotten
much smaller empirical attention. The topic also has some policy relevance
since education is often promoted as an insurance against earnings risk, but
the empirical evidence is mixed at best.
This section proceeds by presenting a simple model which is used to intro-
duce the setup and terminology used in chapters 3 and 4. The setup is adapted
5Therefore, it is not surprising that other methods, besides the one discussed here, have
been presented in recent literature. For reviews, see Card (2001) and Blundell & Dias (2009).
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from Willis & Rosen (1979).
1.4.1 A simple model
Assume that the income of an agent is given by{
y0i = α+ ε0i, if Si = 0,
y1i = α+ δSi + ε1i if Si = 1.
(1.1)
where Si is a binary variable measuring the level of education (Si = 0 if
the agent is an upper secondary school graduate and Si = 1 if the agent
has a university degree). ε0i and ε1i are two zero-mean error terms related
to education levels. Now, if Si was independent of (ε0i, ε1i) , estimating the
return to getting a higher level of education and the associated variance would
be simple. The expected value for return to education would simply be δ and
the variances of earnings for the two education groups would simply read as
V ar (ε0) and V ar (ε1).
A particular example where the independence of schooling choice and dis-
turbance terms might not hold, is the latent utility formulation
Si = I [νi ≥ 0] , (1.2)
where νi is another random variable, ”taste for education”, which summa-
rizes ability, parental example and other characteristics of agents which affect
schooling choices but are not observable to the researcher. I [·] is an indicator
function which has a value of 1 if νi ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
Combining Equations (1.1) and (1.2) gives the expression for the expected
value for the income of the subgroup where Si = 1
E [y1] = α+ δSi + E [ε1 | Si = 1] . (1.3)
The estimate for the return to education, δ, will be biased if the last term in
Equation (3) is non-zero. This occurs if, for example, more skilled individuals
choose Si = 1, but they might also earn more if they had chosen Si = 0.
This equivalent to cov(ε1, ν) 6= 0. The previous discussion is an example of the
”sample selection bias as omitted variable bias” analysis discussed in Heckman
(1979).
The empirical model outlined above imposes assumptions about the infor-
mation set of the agents and the timing of events. The agents observe their
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draw of νi and and choose their level of education accordingly in the first pe-
riod. It is further assumed that agents have full knowledge of the parameters
governing the potential earnings, including the variances of ε0 and ε1 and the
expected values of ε0i and ε1i conditional on νi, but the actual draws of ε0i
and ε1i are only revealed in the second period after the choice of education has
been made.
The residual variances of Equation (1.1) read as:
Variance of yi given S = 0 var (ε0 | Si = 0) ,
Variance of yi given S = 1 var (ε1 | Si = 1) .
These variances are comprised of two parts, the true uncertainty (unknown
to the agents) and unobserved heterogeneity known to (and acted on by) the
agents. The uncertainty faced by the agents reads as6
Uncertainty of S = 0 var (ε0 | ν, Si = 0) ,
Uncertainty of S = 1 var (ε1 | ν, Si = 1) .
Consistent estimation of the model outlined in Equations (1.1) and (1.2)
requires constructing a regression with a mean-zero error term. The estimation
generally requires an instrumental variable, z, which affects the selection into
education, but has no effect on earnings after graduation.
If an instrumental variable is abailable, the estimation can be done in
two stages. In the first stage, the probability of an agent choosing Si = 1
conditional on z is estimated. In the second stage, an additional correction
term which captures E [ε1 | Si = 1, z], or the expected value of the error term
conditional on the education choice made and the instrument. For example,
many researchers who study returns to college in the U.S. use tuition costs at
local colleges as instruments. The underlying assumption is, that of the two
individuals with the same innate ability (i.e., the same draw of ν), the one
living in an ares with low tuition costs is more likely to attend a college.
The formulation of the correction term depends on the assumptions made
about the joint probability distribution of the triple (ε0, ε1, ν). For instance,
under the assumption that (ε0, ε1, ν) is jointly normal, the correction term
6The dispersion in return to education and uncertainty is discussed, among others, in
Aakvik et al. (2010); Chen (2008); Cunha & Heckman (2007, 2008); Cunha et al. (2005) and
Mazza et al. (2011).
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reads as
E [ε0 | Si = 0] = cov(ε0, ν)× var (εo)× −φ(γz)
Φ (γz)
if Si = 0,
E [ε1 | Si = 1] = cov(ε1, ν)× var (ε1)× φ(γz)
Φ (γz)
if Si = 1,
where φ (·) is the standard normal probability density function and Φ (·) is the
standard normal cumulative density function.7
The correction terms retain the assumption that the compound error terms
η0 = ε0− cov(ε0, ν)× var (εo)× −φ(γz)
Φ (γz)
, and η1 = ε1− cov(ε1, ν)× var (ε1)×
φ(γz)
Φ (γz)
have the expected value of zero even under self selection. Further, the
residual variances explained by the bias correction term give an estimate for
the unobserved heterogeneity.
Further, because unobserved heterogeneity affects the agents’ education
choice, the realized cross-sectional dispersion of income is effectively a trun-
cated distribution, which means that observed wage inequality understates the
potential wage inequality for a given level of education. Or,
var(ε0) > var (ε0 | Si = 0) ,
var(ε1) > var (ε1 | Si = 1) .
Intuitively this means that the uncertainty faced by the agents differs from
the uncertainty we would observe if the education was randomly assigned to
individuals.
The aforementioned exposition is somewhat simplified. In particular, in
addition to the unobservable schooling factor, the models featured in chapters
3 and 4 allow people to differ in their observable characteristics by controlling
for age, year of birth, school grades, and a variety of family background char-
acteristics. Further, similarly to chapter 2, I differentiate between permanent
and transitory earnings shocks using the panel dimension of the data.
7Vella (1998) surveys various parametric and semi-parametric models for selectivity cor-
rection. These models typically imply different functional forms of the correction term.
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1.4.2 Uncertainty and Heterogeneity in Returns to
Education: Evidence from Finland
Chapter 3 of this thesis studies the uncertainty related to different education
levels using a broad measure of income which encompasses unemployment
risk. The earnings measure used in the chapter is total yearly taxable income,
which, in addition to wages, includes unemployment benefits and other taxable
income transfers. This gives a possibility also to include the unemployed in
the estimation allowing for a more complete picture of income uncertainty.
The measure of uncertainty used in this chapter is the potential variance of
earnings after correcting for unobserved heterogeneity and truncation.
The chapter studies two interrelated decompositions of the variance of earn-
ings within an education group. First, unobserved heterogeneity and uncer-
tainty are disentangled from one another using a selection correction model
with jointly normal unobservable shocks. The uncertainty is further decom-
posed into permanent and transitory parts using the panel dimension in the
data. The education level is measured as a four-valued ordered categorical
variable which captures the salient features of the Finnish educational system.
The categories are: compulsory education, secondary education (both voca-
tional and upper), lower tertiary education and university level education.
To ensure that the schooling and income equations are jointly identified, I
use local differences in supply of education proxied by the region of residence in
youth as an instrument. Estimation results suggest that even after controlling
for selection, education is a good investment: it brings higher mean earnings
and smaller earnings shocks. Moreover, the income processes of men are riskier
than those of women. The higher male income variance is largely driven by
permanent earnings differences; no differences in unobserved heterogeneity are
found. In addition, transitory shocks affect both genders and almost all edu-
cation groups symmetrically. Only men in the lowest education category face
larger transitory earnings shocks. The estimates on share of unobserved het-
erogeneity in permanent income differences are very small for both sexes and
all education levels.
1.4.3 How Risky Is the Choice of a University Major?
Chapter 4 studies the earnings uncertainty of different majors. Analogously
to chapter 3, earnings are measured by total yearly taxable income and un-
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certainty is measured by the ex ante variance of yearly earnings. The analysis
concentrates on a group of people who have both completed their upper sec-
ondary school degree and graduated from a university sometime in the 1990s
or early 2000s. Since the latest data available is from year 2006, the results
can be seen as reflecting early career income uncertainty.
For computational purposes, the majors are pooled into five roughly similar
categories which are humanities, education and social sciences, law, business,
engineering and natural sciences, and health. Contrary to chapter 3, the selec-
tion correction model is an unordered multinomial one and is adopted from Lee
(1983). The selectivity of each major measured by the ratio of starting places
to applicants is used as a supply-side instrument for major selection. The as-
sumption is that, two similar individuals who face different entry requirements
to majors will end up choosing different major subjects.
The effect of completing an academic degree is found to range between
104 and 169 for men and between 92 and 129 log points for women over the
earnings of an upper secondary education. In addition to increasing expected
returns, university education also is found to decrease earnings uncertainty for
both sexes. The differences in mean earnings between academic fields are found
to be statistically significant at 5% risk level, whereas the confidence intervals
for the uncertainty estimates of different fields are mostly statistically indis-
tinguishable from one another. As in chapter 3, the unobserved heterogeneity
estimates are found to be very small.
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Chapter 2
Earnings Dynamics of Men and
Women in Finland: Permanent
Inequality versus Earnings
Instability1
Abstract
I decompose the earnings variance of Finnish male and female work-
ers into its permanent and transitory components using the approach of
Baker (1997) and Haider (2001) in the spirit of scientific replication.
I find that the increasing earnings inequality of men and women is
driven by both the transitory and permanent components of earnings.
In addition, I find considerable differences in the earnings dynamics of
men and women, that have been largely neglected in previous studies of
earnings dynamics. The inequality among men is dominated by the per-
manent component. Conversely, permanent and transitory components
are of comparable magnitudes to women. As a corollary, men experience
more stable income paths but display larger permanent earnings differ-
ences. Women, on the other hand, face more unstable earnings profiles
but show smaller permanent differences in earnings.
1A paper based on this chapter is published as Kässi (2014)
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2.1 Introduction
Growing earnings inequality has been a common phenomenon to most of the
developed countries since the 1970s and the need to understand this phe-
nomenon has spurred a great deal of research.
Traditional studies of earnings inequality in Finland, as well as in other
countries, have concentrated on measuring cross-sectional earnings inequality
and its annual changes. However, concentrating on cross-sectional inequality
hides an important element of economic inequality, namely the level of mobility
of individuals within the earnings distribution.
More recent studies on earnings dynamics stress the importance of de-
composing earnings inequality into its permanent and transitory parts. These
two components have a different impact on long-term income differences and
consequently have different welfare implications. If the rise in annual income
inequality is driven by the transitory component, it suggests that earnings
have become more volatile. This, in turn, may lead to a decrease in welfare, if
individuals are unable to completely smoothen out income fluctuations. This
might happen if earnings shocks are either very large or very persistent. On
the other hand, if the rise in annual income inequality is due to fixed worker
attributes, it implies that there is also increased inequality in career earn-
ings. If the annual income inequality is driven by the transitory component,
we should observe more year-to-year mobility within income distribution. This
would lead to an increase of inequality in the short term; however it would even
out in the long run. If the permanent component dominates the transitory,
low earnings are a permanent rather than isolated experience.
Examples of factors contributing to the permanent component of earnings
include changes in returns to education or skills, on-the-job training, or other
factors that are relatively fixed from the point of view of an individual worker.2
In this paper, I decompose the annual variance of earnings into permanent
and transitory components and study their evolution over time by fitting an
error component model to observed second moments of earnings processes
using Finnish data. My data are based on filed tax reports, so measurement
2It should be stressed that income volatility may or may not be equivalent to economic
risk. As discussed in Blundell et al. (2008), earnings volatility does not necessarily translate
into changes in welfare. Whether changes in earnings volatility have welfare implications
depends on whether changes are anticipated and whether individuals are able to insure
themselves against instability of earnings.
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errors due to misreporting are arguably substantially smaller than in survey-
based approaches.
The vast majority of existing studies on earnings dynamics concentrate
solely on males, thereby making the implicit assumption that earnings in-
equality between male workers is a good measure for overall earnings inequal-
ity.3 The main contribution of this paper to the existing literature is that
I present the decomposition of earnings separately for men and women. My
approach echoes the observations of Korkeamäki & Kyyrä (2006), who, using
Finnish data, found substantial differences in the educational background be-
tween men and women and also observed that occupations and firms tended to
be segregated into those that were dominated by males and those by females.
Consequently, a picture of earnings inequality solely based on males might be
misleading. To get comparable figures for men and women, I limit my sample
to working males and females and compare their earnings dynamics. Finally,
my earnings data span the years 1988-2007, allowing me to study relatively
recent developments in earnings dynamics.
My paper is heavily influenced by a series of articles that study earnings dy-
namics in other countries. Pioneering studies in this field include Gottschalk &
Moffitt (1994), Moffitt & Gottschalk (2002), Baker (1997), and Haider (2001),
all of which study earnings dynamics in the U.S. Following in their footsteps,
Baker & Solon (2003) and Dickens (2000) present similar decompositions for
Canada and the U.K., respectively. Due their access to a larger data set,
they are able to fit more general models than the ones based on U.S. data.
More recent papers using European registry based data fit variants of Baker &
Solon (2003) and Dickens (2000). These include Gustavsson (2008), who stud-
ies Swedish panel data from 1960 to 1990, Ramos (2003) who studies British
earnings data from the 1990s and Cappellari (2004), who studies Italian earn-
ings data from the 1970s to 1990s. Even though the exact model specifications
and time periods under consideration vary from country to country, the gen-
eral finding is that there are significant differences between countries in terms
of earnings dynamics. It is not clear whether the differences can be attributed
to prevailing institutions or differences in the data. This creates a need to
replicate the analysis using data from a new country. This paper is a scien-
3A notable exception is Ziliak et al. (2011), who report measures of permanent and
transitory earnings inequality separately for men and women and for different educational
groups, but do not limit their study to employed people.
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tific replication study (using the terminology of Hamermesh 2007): it applies
a rather well-established model to a new data.
To give a preview of the results, it transpires that increasing earnings in-
equality is driven by both the permanent and the transitory components; how-
ever their contribution is different for men and women. For men, permanent
inequality predominates over transitory inequality. For women, they are of
a similar magnitude. In addition, permanent earnings differences vary sub-
stantially between cohorts. There has also been a trend of increasing earnings
instability for both sexes during the observation period.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the data and
the sample selection criteria applied. Section 2.3 introduces the model of
earnings dynamics and outlines the estimation method. Section 2.4 provides
the results and subsequent discussion. Section 2.5 contrasts the findings to
previous studies. Section 2.6 offers conclusions.
2.2 Data and sample construction
The data consists of a panel of a one-third random sample of Finnish census.
It covers the years 1988-2007.
The measure of earnings used in this paper is total annual labor earnings
from employment. Earnings are calculated from individual tax files. To ensure
comparability, all earnings are deflated to EUR 2007 using the Consumer Price
Index. By definition, annual earnings are given by hourly wage multiplied
by hours worked. Therefore, the observed earnings inequality reflects two
dimensions of inequality, inequality in wages and inequality in hours worked.
Consequently, the variance of annual earnings is higher than the variance of
hourly wages unless the covariance of wages and hours worked is negative and
large (Abowd & Card, 1989).
My measure of earnings inequality is variance of log annual labor earnings.
Using variance of log earnings as a dependent variable is a standard approach
in papers studying earnings dynamics because mathematical properties of vari-
ance are well established. In addition, correlation between the variance of log
earnings and other widely used inequality measures is very high. Downside of
this choice is that it is not measure-free. Thus, choice of currency unit and
base year affects the measure of total earnings inequality. Nonetheless, the
measure only affects the level of inequality, not the changes. Moreover, the
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decomposition into permanent and transitory components is unaffected by the
measure.
Registry data has some advantages over survey data. Since earnings infor-
mation is collected by the authorities as a part of an administrative process,
non-response and incorrect answers can be ruled out, which results in ex-
tremely reliable data on earnings.4 Attrition from the data can occur only
by migration or death. In addition, definition of taxable labor earnings has
remained unchanged for the period of observation.
Naturally, concentrating solely on labor earnings hides some of the income
differences prevalent in the society. However, I have chosen this approach be-
cause supplementing the data by including capital income is not feasible due
to limited available data. Moreover, including income transfers and paid taxes
would introduce problems, because changes in tax laws and social security el-
igibility rules would severely limit the length of the panel. Another reason to
prefer the measure of income chosen in this paper is that it is broadly equiv-
alent to other papers published on the topic, thus facilitating international
comparisons.
Another minor caveat in the data for the purposes of this paper is that
earnings of over 200,000 Euros are top-coded due to statistical secrecy laws.
This group is small (between .01 % and .05% of yearly observations), so their
effect on the results is arguably small.
2.2.1 Sample selection criteria
The sample selection criteria were adapted from Haider (2001). They were
chosen to ensure that the earnings dynamics of individuals in work are not
confounded by people switching between work and non-work.
The target group in my sample is working males and females of prime age
age between 26 and 60, who are observed for at least six years in total. I assume
that by the age of 26, most people have completed their highest degrees.
I only include person-year observations if the main type of activity of a
person is “working.” In other words, I exclude students, the unemployed, the
retired, and other people outside the workforce. I limit my attention to people
who are working because my interest is in the earnings dynamics of people
4Gottschalk & Huynh (2010) show that earnings inequality decompositions based on
U.S. survey data most likely overstate total inequality due to non-classical measurement
errors.
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who are above the extensive margin. I also exclude working people with zero
yearly earnings, as these observations are likely to have been misclassified.5
After applying the sample selection criteria, I am left with a “revolving
unbalanced panel” (following the terminology of Haider, 2001). The panel is
unbalanced because all the cohorts are not observed for all the years. The
length of the panel varies between 6 and 20 years, depending on the cohort.
Since people are only included if they fulfill the selection criteria, they may
enter and exit the panel. This feature makes the panel revolving. Applying
a revolving, unbalanced panel mitigates problems related to compositional
changes in the workforce due to the business cycle. If workers with unstable
earnings only enter the workforce during an economic boom, they are only
included in the data for those years, for which other selection criteria are
fulfilled.
Since individuals with very volatile earnings are also more likely to per-
manently exit the panel, the approach chosen here introduces a potential se-
lectivity bias to the estimates. Correcting for attrition is not feasible because
the data lack instruments for selection. Still, the approach chosen here is less
restrictive than analyses based on fully balanced panels. In addition, only
including people with no breaks in their earnings histories would probably
overstate the contribution of the permanent earnings component.
Previous papers studying the covariance structure of earnings concentrate
solely on males. The underlying assumption behind this is that the labor force
participation of men is more or less constant, whereas female labor force par-
ticipation is jointly determined with family decisions (e.g. fertility), which may
bias the results. Using a revolving balanced panel partially mitigates this prob-
lem, because only observations from working years are included. Therefore,
transitions into and out of the workforce do not contribute to the empirical
estimation. Nonetheless, it might be be the case, that the working hours
of females vary more than those of males, which may be reflected in female
earnings variances. In addition, it is well established, both theoretically and
empirically (see, e.g., Eckstein & Wolpin, 1989; Euwals et al., 2011 ), that a
large negative earnings shock may promote female fertility decisions. Fertility
decisions might then lower female wages due to their effect on work experi-
5The people are classified as working, if they have worked for over six months within
a year. Therefore, even if there are some observations who are defined as ”working”, they
might have faced spells unemployment over the observation year.
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ence of women. This mechanism introduces a specific kind of selectivity issue:
women with high earnings shocks may voluntarily drop out of the workforce
and concentrate on home production.6 Notwithstanding these caveats, the
data should be representative of those women who are well attached to the
labor force. Furthermore, the labor force participation rate of Finnish women
is very high (Pissarides et al., 2003), which means that the endogenous partic-
ipation of women is less of a problem than in some other countries.
A revolving balanced panel structure ensures that the measure of earnings
inequality in this paper reflects the true earnings inequality of the population
with good attachment to the labor market. Even though sample selection
criteria somewhat differ from other studies, due to different structure of the
data used, they are consistent within the observation period, thus enabling
comparisons between years. Comparisons between countries, on the other
hand, might be more questionable.
I categorize people into two year birth cohorts and follow each cohort
through time. Studies based on a smaller data have been forced to pool all
cohorts together due to small sample sizes. This naturally hides some of the
heterogeneity of earnings dynamics between cohorts. The total size of the
sample used in the analysis is given in Table 2.1.
2.2.2 Descriptive statistics of the covariance structure
In Figure 2.1, I plot the observed earnings variance for workers selected by the
selection criteria given above. For both sexes, the variance decreases between
the years 1988-1991 and thereafter rises until reaching its peak around 1994.
After 1994 earnings inequality falls somewhat but remains high until the end
of the sample period. The variances plotted in Figure 2.1 are somewhat higher
than those observed in most other similar studies. This might be because I
cannot discriminate between full-time and part-time workers. Moreover, in
some studies based on income tax reports, earnings are censored from below,
because income below the tax limit is not observed. This is not the case in
this paper.
To grasp the essential features of earnings dynamics, it is useful to inspect
the autocorrelation profiles of earnings by year and cohort. I have calculated
6It should be noted, that a similar mechanism might be present for male workers too: a
large negative earnings shock may also induce men to drop out of the workforce.
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Cohort Years observed Age in initial year Sample size (men) Sample size (women)
1933-1934 1988-1994 55 2 882 3 673
1935-1936 1988-1996 53 5 169 6 579
1937-1938 1988-1998 51 7 383 8 954
1939-1940 1988-2000 49 8 595 9 987
1941-1942 1988-2002 47 10 398 11 736
1943-1944 1988-2004 45 11 593 12 877
1945-1946 1988-2006 43 16 817 18 481
1947-1948 1988-2007 41 18 760 19 801
1949-1950 1988-2007 39 18 026 19 311
1951-1952 1988-2007 37 17 735 18 784
1953-1954 1988-2007 35 17 643 18 982
1955-1956 1988-2007 33 18 377 18 926
1957-1958 1988-2007 31 17 610 17 769
1959-1960 1988-2007 29 18 060 17 562
1961-1962 1988-2007 27 18 447 16 932
1963-1964 1989-2007 26 18 720 16 700
1965-1966 1991-2007 26 17 945 15 930
1967-1968 1993-2007 26 17 688 15 357
1969-1970 1995-2007 26 16 057 13 476
1971-1972 1997-2007 26 15 095 12 209
1973-1974 1999-2007 26 14 248 11 343
1975-1976 2001-2007 26 13 482 9 548
Total 320 729 314 916
Table 2.1: Cohorts included in the analysis. Note: Age is defined by the older
of the two birth cohorts.
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Figure 2.1: Yearly earnings inequality (measured by variance of log earnings
of workers) of men (solid line) and women (dashed line)
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yearly variance and autocovariances between years for people who are observed
in both years. For cohorts who are observed for the full twenty years this adds
up to 210 unique covariance elements (21×20/2) and less for the other cohorts.
In total, the unique elements of covariance matrices add up to 3,066 covariance
elements.
Figure 2.2 presents the yearly variances and covariances between annual
earnings for selected cohorts of men and women. Figure 2.2 shows that there
are substantial differences in the variances and autocovariances of male and
female earnings. This suggests that there are considerable differences in the
earnings dynamics of men and women, making it reasonable to estimate sep-
arate models for the two sexes. In addition, a comparison of years reveals
strong year effects. These are especially apparent during the recession of the
early 1990s. The difference between variance and the first autocovariance is
relatively large. In addition, autocovariances remain positive even at long lags,
indicating that there are considerable permanent earnings differences. Finally,
the variance and autocovariance values are larger for the oldest cohort, even
at longer lags, which suggests the presence of cohort effects in the permanent
component of earnings.
An alternative way to study cohort covariances is to keep the year fixed
and plot covariances by age. This is done for three selected years in Figure 2.3.
Comparing years reveals that income variances and covariances have risen over
time for both men and for women, which indicates that earnings inequality has
increased during the panel time and that at least part of this rise is due to a rise
in permanent earnings differences. The variances are higher for young women
than for young men, but as people grow older, the higher growth in variances
of male earnings causes men to overtake women in terms of earnings inequality.
The difference between the variance and autocovariances of earnings is at its
largest for young women, indicating that high earnings inequality among young
women is driven by transitory differences. For men, the difference between the
variance and covariances remains almost constant, regardless of age.
To summarize, in addition to being able to disentangle permanent and tran-
sitory income differences, the preferred model for earnings inequality should
reflect both cohort and year effects. The model should also allow variances of
permanent and transitory components to change as people age.
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Figure 2.2: Autocovariances of yearly log earnings for selected cohorts
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Figure 2.3: Autocovariances of yearly log earnings for selected years
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2.3 Model and estimation
In this section, I introduce the econometric model and the estimation method.
I estimate an error-components model with permanent and transitory com-
ponents. The model allows individuals to permanently differ in their mean
earnings as well as the earnings growth rate. The transitory component is
modeled as an AR(1) process. As a result, even transitory shocks are allowed
to exhibit persistence and can consequently take more than one year to flatten
out.
2.3.1 Econometric model
Let Yibt denote log earnings in year t of person i born in year b. Individual
earnings can be expressed as deviations from means, or
Yibt = µbt + yibt.
Since my interest lies in the second moments of the distribution of Yibt, it
suffices to write a model for de-meaned wages yibt. Expressing µbt as cohort-age
means captures average year, age, and cohort effects in a more flexible fashion
than using regression models with cohort-specific polynomials. The simplest
possible model for yibt is
yibt = ptαibt + λtεibt (2.1)
where the two terms are assumed to be orthogonal to each other. Equation
(2.1) can be seen as a Mincerian earnings equation of relative earnings, where
αibt stands for the observed characteristics of individuals and εibt is the er-
ror term. pt and λt are year-specific factor loadings. Applying the variance
operator to both sides yields
Var (yibt) = p
2
tσ
2
α + λ
2
tσ
2
ε . (2.2)
Equation (2.2) gives the basic intuition of the decomposition. ptσ2α denotes the
variance of the permanent component of earnings, and λtσ2ε denotes the vari-
ance of the transitory component. An increase in either component increases
the dispersion of earnings, but an increase in λtσ2ε also implies that churning
within the earnings distribution increases.
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Even though Equation (2.2) is intuitive, it may be too restrictive for two
reasons. First, the variance of transitory shocks may exhibit age-related het-
eroskedasticity because workers at the start of their careers may have more
unstable earnings.7 In addition, different cohorts may have different skills or
other idiosyncratic features that affect the variability of their earnings. To
incorporate these features, the following generalization of Equation (2.1) is
used
yibt = qbptuibt + εibt, (2.3)
where
uibt = αi + βixt, (2.4)
εibt = ρεibt−1 + λtνibt. (2.5)
The terms αi, βi and νi are random variables first and second moments denoted
as: [
αi
βi
]
∼
([
α¯
β¯
]
,
[
σ2α σαβ
σ2β
])
(2.6)
and
νibt ∼
(
ν¯, γ0 + γ1xt + γ2x
2
t
)
. (2.7)
x is defined as the potential experience of each cohort in year t, i.e., x =
t− b− 26.
In Equation (2.4) uibt is a random growth term. It describes the permanent
component of earnings. σ2α reflects the variance of the earnings profiles of
individuals at the age of 26, and the variance in σ2β reflects the deviation of
the individual-specific growth rate from the average growth rate of each cohort
(the average growth rate is captured in µbt). pt and qc are year and cohort
factor loadings, respectively.
The transitory component of earnings in (2.5) is given by a mean-reverting
AR(1) process. λt are year-specific factor loadings on the innovation νibt. This
7Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) report significant heteroskedasticity in earnings instability
using U.S. data, albeit using a different model. Baker & Solon (2003) and Gustavsson (2008)
reach similar conclusions using Canadian and Swedish data, respectively.
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specification assumes that an earnings shock takes more than one year to flat-
ten out and that earnings shocks accumulate over time. In addition, Equation
(2.7) allows transitory variance to be a quadratic function of experience. The
transitory and permanent components of earnings are assumed to be orthog-
onal to one another. To make identification possible, I have normalized p1988
and λ1989 and q1951−1952 to 1.
Equations (2.3)–(2.7) generate non-stationarity to the variances of earn-
ings processes through time-varying factor loadings for the permanent and the
transitory components, pt and λt. Another source of non-stationarity is the
polynomial form of transitory shock variance. The intuition remains the same:
a rise in pt or qc increases permanent income differences, whereas a rise in λt
increases the shuﬄing of workers.
In line with the model specifications in Baker & Solon (2003) and Gustavs-
son (2008), polynomial form of var(νibt) recognizes that the earnings instability
may vary between individuals because they are at different stages of their ca-
reers. The yearly factor loadings of the permanent and transitory components
also give insights into the forces driving changes in income distribution.
The justification for the formulation in Equation (2.4) is both theoretical
and empirical. For example, it has been successfully applied in Haider (2001),
Ramos (2003), and Cappellari (2004), who demonstrate that in addition to
allowing heterogeneity in mean earnings, the slope of earnings and the covari-
ance of the two are important for capturing the dynamics of earnings. In most
previous studies, the covariance term σαβ is found to be negative. This is con-
sistent with the on-the-job training hypothesis (see, e.g., Lillard & Weiss 1979;
Hause 1980; and Baker 1997), which states that individuals may accept lower
earnings at the beginning of their career, since they anticipate that their earn-
ings will rise at a high enough rate and for a long enough time to compensate
for low earnings at the beginning of their career. On the other hand, if σαβ is
found to be positive, it is consistent with the schooling-matching hypothesis,
in which better skilled workers are endowed with more education, which raises
their initial earnings and causes them to enjoy faster earnings growth as the
quality of the match is revealed to their employers (Cappellari, 2004).
In addition to the specification in Equations (2.3)–(2.7), usually known
as “random growth specification”, I have also experimented with other spec-
ifications, in particular, with the so called “random walk specification” (e.g.,
Gustavsson 2008), which is another widely used specification. This model is
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given by uibt = uibt−1 + ξit, where ξit is a white noise process. The main dif-
ference between the two formulations is that the random growth specification
allows the correlation of the intercept and slope terms to be nonzero, whereas
the random walk specification does not. In this sense, the random growth spec-
ification nests the random walk specification. Trials with the random growth
specification always resulted in a statistically significant estimate for σαβ. I
interpret this as a sign that the random walk model is inconsistent with the
observed covariance structure of earnings.
Random walk and random growth specifications have different implications
in terms of the age-derivative of cross-sectional variances. Under the random
walk specification, the variance of earnings increases linearly with age, whereas
under the random growth specification, the growth of permanent earnings
inequality is either convex or concave, depending on the sign of σαβ (Guvenen,
2009).8
2.3.2 Estimation
Direct estimation of a model based on equations (2.3)-(2.7) is inefficient, be-
cause it means estimating αi and βi for each individual with only a small
number of observations. Since I am interested in the second moments of earn-
ings distribution, I therefore estimate them directly. To accomplish this, I
write down the variance of earnings in year t for cohort b implied by (2.3):
Var (yibt) = q
2
bp
2
t
[
σ2α + x
2σ2β + 2xσαβ
]
+
ρ2var (εibt−1) + λ2t var (νibt) . (2.8)
Respectively, a general covariance element between year t earnings and year
t− h (h > 0) earnings is given by9
Cov (yibt, yibt−h) = q2bptpt−h
[
σ2α + x(x− h)σ2β + (2x− h)σαβ
]
+ρhvar (εibt−h) . (2.9)
8Since random walk and random growth specifications do not necessarily rule each other
out, some researchers (e.g. Baker & Solon, 2003 and Ramos, 2003) incorporate both into the
same model. In my data, this specification either does not converge or results in negative
variance estimates. Furthermore, the interpretation of these nested specifications is far from
clear.
9Identification of earnings instability is made possible only by the off-diagonal elements of
the covariance matrix. The underlying intuition is that a high correlation between earnings
at t and earnings at t− h implies a low instability of earnings.
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The term var (εibt) is calculated by backtracking the recursion in Equation
(2.5) to the first sample year of each cohort. Since the earnings time series are
relatively short, consequent covariances depend on the variance of the initial
shock. This makes the standard time series analysis assumption of zero initial
conditions problematic. I follow the suggestion of MaCurdy (1982; 2007) and
treat the variances of initial shocks as extra parameters to be estimated. This
parameter also takes into account transitory earnings differences accumulated
before the start of the sample. These parameters are denoted by σ2b .
10
The unbalanced panel structure disentangles collinearity between experi-
ence and cohort effects from one another making it possible to identfy all of
them. If the were balanced panel, the difference between average experience
levels between years t and t + 1 would be always identically one. With an
unbalanced panel, the average experience level also grows between adjacent
years, but its growth rate is not exactly one since some cohorts enter the panel
and others exit from it.11
Since the panel is revolving, an individual can only contribute to an element
(t, t − h) in the covariance matrix, if he or she is observed in years t and
t − h. The sample covariances are thus calculated as the earnings covariance
of people who are observed in both years. Consequently, people who have
a higher attachment to the labor market contribute more to the empirical
covariance matrices, which leads to a sample selection problem that cannot be
completely overcome by unbalanced revolving panel construction. This is a
common caveat in papers of this genre.
The estimation boils down to minimizing the distance between the cohort
earnings covariances implied by the model and the empirical autocovariances
calculated from the data. I stack each unique covariance matrix element into
vector C. The estimation is done by GMM, i.e., by minimizing a weighted
distance between observed autocovariancesC and those implied by the model
F (θ) , where θ is a vector of 87 parameters to be estimated. In practice, I
10Initial variance parameters have a different interpretation depending on whether earn-
ings trajectories start from the age 26 or at a later age. For a cohort who has been 26 years
of age before 1988, the initial variance is a measure of the transitory variance accumulated
before 1988, whereas for a cohort who is observed for the first time after 1988, the initial
variance is a measure of labor market conditions at the time of labor market entry.
11Cohort, age, and year are naturally perfectly collinear for individual observations, but
this does not hold for second moments of the population.
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minimize the standard GMM criterion function
H = [C− F (θ)]′W [C− F (θ)] . (2.10)
Altonji & Segal (1996) demonstrate that using an asymptotically optimal
GMM weighting matrix, i.e., choosing W =
[
F (θ)′F (θ)
]−1
, can lead to a
very large finite-sample bias. This is due to
[
F (θ)′F (θ)
]
being very close to
singular. In line with the bulk of the earnings dynamics literature, I have cho-
sen the identity matrix as the weighting matrix. This approach is called the
Equally Weighted Minimum Distance estimation (Chamberlain, 1984). Us-
ing the identity matrix as the weighting matrix gives consistent but possibly
inefficient estimates.
The asymptotic standard errors of vector θ are given by the standard GMM
covariance matrix based on the fourth moments of the data. That is
Var(θ) =
(
D′D
)−1
D′ΩD
(
D′D
)−1
,
where D =
∂F (θ)
∂θ′
and Ω = [C− F (θ)]′Q [C− F (θ)] are evaluated at the
solution θ = θˆ. Q is a block diagonal matrix of ones. Including Q in the
matrix product effectively sets the covariances between cohorts at zero.
2.4 Estimation results
2.4.1 Parameter estimates
Figure 2.4 decomposes total earnings inequality into its permanent and tran-
sitory components. The decomposition is based on equation (2.8). The term
p2t
[
σ2α + x
2σ2β + 2xσαβ
]
accounts for the permanent component of earnings
and term ρ2var (εibt−1) + λ2t var (νibt) accounts for the transitory component.
The contribution of permanent earnings inequality to total inequality is
larger for men than for women in almost all years. This implies that permanent
inequality among men is larger than among women. The contribution of the
permanent component has remained roughly similar throughout the sample,
with the exception of the recession years 1991 and 1992. Even though the
magnitude of the two components differ between sexes, the dynamics of the
two components were roughly similar for both sexes for the entire sample
period.
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Figure 2.4: Decomposition of the variance of log earnings among men and
women measured in percentages. Predicted variance is calculated as the sum
of the persistent and transitory components
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Men Women
Parameter S.E. Parameter S.E.
p1988 1 1
p1989 1.017 0.010 0.983 0.011
p1990 1.014 0.009 0.944 0.010
p1991 0.737 0.019 0.811 0.009
p1992 0.754 0.019 0.813 0.008
p1993 1.071 0.016 0.913 0.012
p1994 1.102 0.016 0.937 0.009
p1995 1.094 0.018 0.907 0.012
p1996 1.079 0.016 0.908 0.016
p1997 1.063 0.014 0.892 0.015
p1998 1.058 0.017 0.907 0.016
p1999 1.067 0.020 0.898 0.016
p2000 1.054 0.016 0.904 0.013
p2001 1.043 0.014 0.894 0.015
p2002 1.043 0.015 0.893 0.015
p2003 1.063 0.014 0.889 0.012
p2004 1.067 0.013 0.876 0.011
p2005 1.044 0.013 0.855 0.012
p2006 1.028 0.013 0.854 0.013
p2007 1.017 0.015 0.825 0.012
q1933−1934 0.977 0.016 0.777 0.010
q1935−1936 1.054 0.012 0.846 0.007
q1937−1938 1.076 0.009 0.847 0.005
q1939−1940 1.005 0.007 0.876 0.004
q1941−1942 1.049 0.005 0.904 0.003
q1943−1944 1.047 0.004 0.940 0.003
q1945−1946 1.033 0.003 0.938 0.002
q1947−1948 1.034 0.002 0.958 0.001
q1949−1950 1.004 0.001 0.971 0.001
q1951−1952 1 1
q1953−1954 1.000 0.001 1.014 0.001
q1955−1956 1.004 0.002 1.059 0.002
q1957−1958 1.026 0.004 1.097 0.003
q1959−1960 1.010 0.005 1.148 0.005
q1961−1962 1.037 0.007 1.187 0.007
q1963−1964 1.018 0.009 1.192 0.010
q1965−1966 0.992 0.011 1.217 0.012
q1967−1968 0.952 0.013 1.223 0.015
q1969−1970 0.922 0.015 1.267 0.018
q1971−1972 0.907 0.017 1.260 0.023
q1973−1974 0.863 0.020 1.294 0.031
q1975−1976 0.774 0.026 1.129 0.050
σ2a 0.156 0.003 0.093 0.002
σ2b 1.5 ∗ 10−5 8 ∗ 10−6 2.9 ∗ 10−5 6 ∗ 10−6
σab 0.004 2 ∗ 10−4 0.004 1 ∗ 10−4
Table 2.2: Estimated parameters of permanent component of earnings.
33
Men Women
Parameter S.E. Parameter S.E.
λ1988 (unrestricted) (unrestricted)
λ1989 1 1
λ1990 1.057 0.018 1.043 0.019
λ1991 1.279 0.067 1.086 0.024
λ1992 1.380 0.066 1.156 0.024
λ1993 1.384 0.050 1.207 0.028
λ1994 1.487 0.060 1.273 0.031
λ1995 1.413 0.057 1.276 0.032
λ1996 1.395 0.063 1.254 0.036
λ1997 1.349 0.065 1.244 0.037
λ1998 1.366 0.079 1.277 0.039
λ1999 1.335 0.068 1.297 0.043
λ2000 1.331 0.075 1.290 0.047
λ2001 1.290 0.072 1.287 0.047
λ2002 1.288 0.073 1.214 0.051
λ2003 1.243 0.071 1.203 0.062
λ2004 1.239 0.076 1.230 0.057
λ2005 1.253 0.071 1.271 0.054
λ2006 1.312 0.080 1.319 0.050
λ2007 1.302 0.073 1.358 0.045
σ21933−1934 0.025 0.009 0.058 0.005
σ21935−1936 0.003 0.009 0.023 0.004
σ21937−1938 0.067 0.009 0.029 0.004
σ21939−1940 0.054 0.007 0.035 0.004
σ21941−1942 0.097 0.008 0.053 0.004
σ21943−1944 0.101 0.007 0.071 0.004
σ21945−1946 0.109 0.007 0.088 0.004
σ21947−1948 0.132 0.006 0.117 0.004
σ21949−1950 0.123 0.006 0.120 0.003
σ21951−1952 0.128 0.005 0.150 0.003
σ21953−1954 0.113 0.005 0.188 0.003
σ21955−1956 0.106 0.004 0.216 0.003
σ21957−1958 0.103 0.004 0.220 0.003
σ21959−1960 0.117 0.004 0.218 0.003
σ21961−1962 0.135 0.003 0.230 0.002
σ21963−1964 0.141 0.004 0.227 0.004
σ21965−1966 0.210 0.004 0.254 0.002
σ21967−1968 0.323 0.005 0.357 0.002
σ21969−1970 0.281 0.003 0.361 0.002
σ21971−1972 0.246 0.003 0.318 0.003
σ21973−1974 0.255 0.004 0.362 0.004
σ21975−1976 0.205 0.005 0.318 0.007
ρ 0.223 0.012 0.226 0.009
γ0 0.112 0.013 0.249 0.015
γ1 -0.001 0.001 -0.011 0.001
γ2 9 ∗ 10−6 2.7 ∗ 10−5 2 ∗ 10−4 3 ∗ 10−5
Table 2.3: Estimated parameters of transitory variance of earnings.
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The transitory components of the earnings inequality of men and women
are highly correlated, although the transitory inequality is higher for women.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the estimates of the parameters of the permanent
and transitory components. I will discuss both parameters in turn.
An initial glance at Tables 2.2 and 2.3 shows that most parameter esti-
mates have very small standard errors. That is, they are accurately estimated,
in spite of the model being flexibly parameterized and including year, cohort,
and experience effects. Table 2.2 reports the parameters of permanent earn-
ings differences. The level term σ2α is statistically significantly larger for men
than it is for women. The slope term σ2β and the correlation term σαβ are
of similar magnitude for both sexes. Moreover, the estimated correlation be-
tween the intercept and slope terms is positive. This means that people who
have higher initial earnings also have larger earnings growth. As a result, the
permanent part of earnings distribution becomes increasingly unequal over the
life cycle.
For men, yearly loadings on the permanent earnings component are almost
constant, except for the two deepest recession years. For women, there is a
downward trend in yearly loadings, indicating that permanent earnings differ-
ences have decreased during the end of the 1990s and early 2000s. Changes in
the permanent component yearly loading can be interpreted as the prices of
the fixed skills of individuals, keeping cohort effects constant.
The deep Finnish recession experienced by Finland in the early 1990s is
visible as a drop in the permanent earnings inequality component.12 The
explanation for this drop is that people with lowest wages dropped out of the
workforce, which had the effect of decreasing earnings inequality. However, the
effect of the recession is much less clear in the time series of transitory shocks.
Next, I will turn to estimates for cohort loadings on the permanent compo-
nent qc. The most intuitive interpretation for the cohort loadings of permanent
component is that they are a measure of the dispersion of the skills within a
cohort. An alternative interpretation for qc is that they reflect very persistent
shocks that affect cohorts differently even if the skill dispersion of cohorts does
not change. An example of such shocks is the long-term wage scarring effect of
graduating in a recession (see, e.g., Kwon et al. 2010, and Oreopoulos & von
12Finland experienced the deepest economic recession experienced in any industrialized
country since the 1930s. For details, see, e.g., Gorodnichenko et al. (2012) and Honkapohja
& Koskela (1999).
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Wachter 2008).
Coinciding with the decrease in yearly factor loadings for women is the
increase in cohort loadings for the permanent component of earnings. This
implies that earnings inequality for all women has decreased since the 1990s,
but at the same time, younger cohorts are more unequal than older cohorts.
In other words, as younger cohorts have become more skilled, within cohort
inequality has increased but at the same time the inequality between cohorts
has decreased. For men, however, the inequality time-trend is exactly the
opposite: the younger cohorts are more equal than the older ones.
Finally, I will turn to the estimates for the transitory component reported
in the bottom four rows of Table 2.3. The estimate for the AR coefficient is
0.22 for men and women. The age profile of variance of the transitory shocks,
visualized in Figure 2.5, is strikingly different between men and women. For
men, γ1 and γ2 do not differ from zero at conventional risk levels, which implies
that there is no age-related heteroskedasticity in the variance of transitory
shocks. For women, on the other hand, the variance of transitory shocks is
decreasing and convex. For women under 30, transitory shock variance is over
double that of men. Furthermore, regardless of the cohort, initial earnings
shocks are considerably higher for women than for men. This observation is
roughly consistent with Lundberg & Rose (2000), who find that motherhood
decreases the labor supply of married women who are attached to the labor
market but not their wages.
Yearly loadings on the transitory component of earnings λt also exhibit
different trends for men and women.13 For men, they peak in 1994, whereafter,
they decline somewhat but still remain above one until 2007. For women, there
is an almost constant rise from 1988 to 2007.
Adding cohort loadings to the transitory component always resulted in con-
vergence problems. This suggests that combining cohort loadings of the transi-
tory component with the cohort specific initial variances (σ2b ) over-parameterize
the model. Therefore, earnings instability seems to be symmetric for all co-
horts when initial conditions have been accounted for. Earnings instability
seems to be more related to labor market conditions prevailing in society than
13To ensure that initial variance parameters are only identified by the initial variance in
cohort’s first sample year, λ1988 is left unrestricted and λ1989 is normalized to 1. Without
this restriction, yearly loadings on the transitory component and the initial variances could
not be jointly identified.
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Figure 2.5: Variance of the transitory shocks of men and women as a function
of age.
to differences in the human capital within cohorts. Nonetheless, for both sexes,
the contribution of rising earnings instability to inequality is substantial.
2.4.2 Decomposition analysis: cohorts and years
The parameter estimates only give a partial description of the evolution of
earnings dynamics. As discussed in the previous subsection, there is substan-
tial variation between cohorts and years. To get further insight into these
differences, this subsection introduces counterfactual analyses, which are ob-
tained by eliminating sets of parameters in turn.
Figure 2.6 plots the contributions of the cohort and the year effects on
permanent inequality. For men, setting the year effects to 1 eliminates most of
the permanent differences. This is consistent with the notion that permanent
earnings differences of males are driven by the changes in returns to skill rather
than differences in the skill composition of cohorts. However, the same expla-
nation does not apply for females, as eliminating the year effects in permanent
component actually increases female earnings inequality. This suggests that
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permanent female inequality is driven by within cohort inequality rather than
year-to-year changes.
Turning to transitory earnings differences, plotted in Figure 2.7, we see
similar patterns for men and women. Eliminating the year loadings flattens
most of the transitory shocks. This unequivocally suggests that earnings have
become more unstable for both sexes. The slight downward trend in the tran-
sitory inequality of females is explained by the age-gradient of the transitory
shock variance: older people face smaller transitory shocks.
The underlying assumption in the preceding discussion is that the model
is correctly specified and all of the parameters are strongly identified. The
following section discusses the evidence in favor of strong identification.
wh
2.4.3 Sensitivity of results to model specification
Generally, weak identification can arise if the moment condition is small, but
not zero, at a range of values differing from the true parameter value θ0. Stock
& Wright (2000) show that the asymptotic theory devised for identified models
is invalid for weakly identified models. As a result, the parameter estimates of
weakly identified models are inconsistent, and the calculated covariance matrix
does not converge to the true covariance matrix, which results in invalid esti-
mates for standard errors. Furthermore, even if most parameters are strongly
identified, their asymptotic standard errors might be invalid in the presence
of some weakly identified parameters. In the context of this paper, weak iden-
tification may arise if ρ is close to 1. If ρ ≈ 1, the transitory component is
”very close to being permanent”. This causes problems in identification, since
both the transitory and permanent components reflect relatively permanent
earnings inequality making it difficult to distinguish them from one another,
especially if the panel length is short.
Doris et al. (2012) gives Monte Carlo evidence on the ranges of parameter
values that lead to biased estimates. According to Tables 2a and 3 in their
paper, a model estimated using eight panel years of observations and ρ = .8 is
sufficient to give unbiased results. Since my panel length is well over that for
most cohorts (median panel length in my data is 17 years) and my estimates
of ρ are well below .8, I am confident about the strong identification of the
models estimated. In addition, linear time trends in any factor loading might
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Figure 2.6: The effects of eliminating year and cohort loadings on permanent
earnings inequality for men and women.
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Figure 2.7: The effects of eliminating year loadings on transitory earnings
inequality for men and women.
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also cause problems in identification. Such trends are not present in my data.
I have not applied Newey’s (1985) specification test to assess the goodness
of fit, because a general finding in the earnings dynamics literature is that
the null hypothesis of a correctly specified model is almost always rejected.
According to Baker & Solon (2003), these tests have inflated sizes when the
amount of overidentifying restrictions is as large as in this case (3,066 moment
conditions used to identify 87 parameters).
Another possible caveat, according to the warnings given in Baker & Solon
(2003) and Shin & Solon (2011), is that an arbitrary change in a parametric
model may lead to different conclusions. I have experimented with alternative
specifications (given in Table 2.4) and do not find cause for concern. First,
as is evident from the difference in the mean squared errors (MSE’s) between
the random growth and random walk models and the statistically significant
estimate of σαβ , the data clearly reject the simpler random walk specification
in favor of the random growth specification.
Second, the model with an ARMA(1,1) specification for the transitory
component gives similar results to the AR(1) specification. The main difference
in these two specifications is that the inclusion of the MA(1) parameter reduces
the absolute value of the persistence parameter ρ. This difference is statistically
significant for women but not for men. Inclusion of the MA(1) parameter does
not have a jointly statistically significant impact for other parameters than ρ.
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2.5 Comparison to other studies
To better grasp which of the differences between this paper and papers us-
ing data from other countries are due to differences in econometric modeling
choices or data and which are due to prevailing institutional differences, this
section contrasts the central findings of this with previous studies. Two find-
ings in this paper are different from most previous papers: the sign of the
correlation between earnings growth and intercept components, σαβ, and the
autocorrelation coefficient of the transitory earnings component ρ.
My estimate for σαβ is positive for both sexes, which implies that the
distribution of earnings widens as people age. Cappellari (2004) reports a
similar finding for Italy, but other studies I am aware of (Haider, 2001; Baker
& Solon, 2003; Baker, 1997; Gustavsson, 2008; Ramos, 2003) report a negative
parameter estimate. It is difficult to judge whether these differences are more
due to data construction or institutional differences. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that the studies that find σαβ < 0 use various earnings measures as well
as data sources.
Since I do not observe hours worked by an individual, I am not able to
discriminate between full-time and part-time workers. This inevitably affects
some of the results. Consequently, my estimates for the contribution of the
transitory component to total inequality are much larger than those obtained
in studies concentrating only on full time workers (these include Baker &
Solon, 2003; Haider, 2001; Gustavsson, 2008). Moreover, the persistence of
transitory shocks is found to be considerably lower. Baker & Solon (2003),
Dickens (2000), and Haider (2001) report estimated autocorrelation values in
the range of 0.6 and 0.95, however, they concentrate on full-time working
males. In contrast, Ramos (2003) does not discriminate between full-time and
part-time workers. He finds that the transitory component may account for
up to 80 percent of yearly earnings variance. Ramos also finds ρˆ estimates in
the range of 0.29 and 0.41, which are considerably closer to my estimates.
Another partial explanation to the low estimated persistence of transi-
tory shocks is that, generally speaking, random walk specification results in
higher persistence compared to random growth specifications. Indeed, Guve-
nen (2009) shows analytically that if a random growth model is misspecified
as a random walk model, the persistence parameter ρ will be biased upwards.
Making comparisons between other countries is also somewhat suspect,
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because separating prevailing differences in labor market conditions from dif-
ferences in the data is far from straightforward. The most comparable study
to the current one in terms of data is Ramos (2003), who studies male earnings
inequality in the U.K. between 1991 and 1999. Most notable difference between
the results in Ramos (2003) and those in this study are that Ramos finds that
older workers face very unstable earnings compared to younger workers. For
example, according to his estimates, the transitory component constitutes over
80 per cent of the total income variance for a cohort over 50 years old at the end
of the observation period. This is considerably higher than my findings; and it
is most likely attributable to institutional differences (e.g., a higher proportion
of part-time workers over 50 in Great Britain compared to Finland).
2.6 Summary and conclusions
Previous research has shown that earnings inequality has risen in Finland
during the last two decades. This paper decomposes the yearly Finnish log
earnings variance of the working population into its permanent and transi-
tory components. The analysis is done separately for men and women. The
econometric analysis is based on the second moments of log-earnings distribu-
tion using the Equally Weighted Minimum Distance method of Chamberlain
(1984).
I find that the increase in earnings inequality among men and women is
driven by both the permanent and transitory components, but the contribu-
tions of these components are of different magnitude. The permanent compo-
nent of earnings inequality is larger for men than for women. As a corollary,
men enjoy more stable income paths but with larger permanent earnings differ-
ences. Women, on the other hand, experience more unstable earnings processes
but have smaller permanent differences in earnings.
The age-derivative of the permanent earnings inequality of men and women
is similar, indicating that the relative differences in permanent earnings stay
similar throughout the careers of men and women. The correlation between
initial earnings inequality and the growth in earnings inequality is found to
be positive for both sexes, implying a divergence of earnings profiles and in-
creasing permanent earnings differences toward the end of individuals’ working
career. Compared to findings, in other countries the persistence of transitory
earnings shocks is found to be relatively small. Moreover, the contribution
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of transitory shocks to inequality has risen considerably for both sexes. This
strongly suggests that earnings have become more unstable during the last 20
years.
Finding ultimate causes for the changes in persistent and transitory in-
equality is beyond the scope of this paper, but some tentative explanations can
be offered. For both sexes, we see that year loadings on the permanent inequal-
ity drive a lot of the earnings differences. This might be due to yearly changes
in labor demand. On the other hand, the larger cohort effects of younger co-
horts on permanent female earnings inequality suggest that younger working
women face higher permanent earnings inequality than older women. It seems
plausible that this is due to the high labor force participation of young women
rather than changing returns to skill, as there is no such trend for cohorts of
men.
Finally, the lessons of this paper suggest that researchers applying esti-
mates obtained from these types of models in their work may inadvertedly
miss potentially important aspects of the earnings dynamics prevalent in soci-
ety if they only concentrate on males.
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Chapter 3
Uncertainty and Heterogeneity
in Returns to Education:
Evidence from Finland
Abstract
This paper studies the causal effect of education on income un-
certainty using a broad measure of income which encompasses unem-
ployment risk. To accomplish this, the variance of residuals from a
Mincer-type income regression is decomposed into unobserved hetero-
geneity (known to the individuals when making their educational choices)
and uncertainty (unknown to the individual). The estimation is done us-
ing Finnish registry data. The effect of having secondary or lower tertiary
level education decreases income uncertainty. University level education
is found to have a small positive marginal effect on income uncertainty.
The effect of education on income uncertainty is roughly similar for men
when compared to women, but income uncertainty is larger for men than
for women regardless of education. Contrary to some results from the
U.S., the role of unobserved heterogeneity is found to be very small.
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3.1 Introduction
Return to education is perhaps the most widely studied causal relationship in
contemporary economic literature. A central message from this literature is
that measuring monetary return to education is complicated by endogenous
selection. Endogenous selection arises simply from the fact that people who
choose different levels of education levels are likely to differ from one another in
some dimensions unobservable to the researcher. Neglecting this unobserved
heterogeneity may potentially bias into return estimates. Monetary uncer-
tainty in return to education has received much smaller empirical attention.
The return to education varies between individuals and materializes possibly
only several years after the choice of education has been made, which imply
that educational investment has an inherent uncertainty to it. Analogously to
estimating mean returns to education, endogenous selection also complicates
the estimation of uncertainty in monetary returns to education.
The measure of earnings uncertainty used throughout this paper is the
variance of yearly income. A direct comparison of income variances between
university and high school educated people might give an incorrect picture of
the effect of education on income variance, because we cannot observe coun-
terfactual income streams of the same people with different education levels.
Consequently, the observed variance of income may not be a good measure of
uncertainty, because it is comprised of two distinct components: unobserved
heterogeneity and uncertainty. The intuition for this dichotomy follows from
private information: earnings uncertainty, or risk, is the part of the earnings
variance, which is not foreseeable by the decision-maker.
Unobserved heterogeneity (due to, for example, individual ability, motiva-
tion and general taste for education), on the other hand, is the portion of the
earnings variance which is known to – and acted on by – the individual, but not
observed by the researcher. The unobserved heterogeneity is intimately related
to private information on potential returns to education possessed by individ-
uals. For example, if a person knows that her personal return from a given
education level is particularly high, she will most likely choose that level of
education. Disentangling unobserved heterogeneity (which stems from private
information) from true uncertainty from the point of view of the agent making
the schooling decision is instrumental when studying income uncertainty.
The question of how education affects income uncertainty is also of policy
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relevance. If, for example, more educated agents face larger income uncer-
tainty, risk-averse agents might choose less education than would be socially
optimal. This would suggest that income transfers supporting higher education
are socially beneficial. On the other hand, if the earnings differences within
an education group can be explained by unobserved heterogeneity rather than
uncertainty, there might be less room for insurance against uncertainty.
This paper studies two interrelated decompositions. First, I correct for
self-selection by modeling the selection of education level. Second, I decom-
pose the uncertainty of income into a permanent component, which reflects
fixed characteristics of individuals and a transitory component, which reflects
idiosyncratic shocks to income streams of individuals. The transitory compo-
nent is allowed to vary by time and by education level.
I follow Chen (2008) who extends the framework of Roy (1951) into more
than two sectors. Chen disentangles potential variance and unobserved hetero-
geneity from one another, while taking into account the fact that the selection
of agents into educational categories is endogenous. Chen estimates her model
using data on U.S. males. She finds that the uncertainty-education profile is
U-shaped; the most and least educated individuals face the highest income
uncertainty. In addition, according to her model, unobserved heterogeneity is
estimated to be up to 20 percent of the total earnings uncertainty.
The dependent variable in Chen’s paper is average hourly wage. Her ap-
proach disregards perhaps the most important source of earnings uncertainty;
namely, the risk of unemployment. Instead of hourly wages, this paper studies
yearly total taxable income, which, in addition to income from employment,
includes unemployment benefits and other taxable transfers. This measure
arguably gives a more complete picture of the income uncertainty related to a
level of education. This is particularly relevant because international evidence
suggests that differences in unemployment risks between education groups are
substantial (e.g. Guiso et al., 2002) and have widened in recent decades (Ace-
moglu & Autor, 2011). Using total taxable income as the measure of income
also mitigates the problem of endogenous selection into employment, as people
are observed even if they are not working. The model presented in this paper
is estimated using Finnish data. An attractive feature of the Finnish tax code
for the current purposes is that virtually all of the income transfers, including
unemployment benefits, are taxable and are therefore observed.
I also depart from Chen’s approach in another way. Namely, I estimate
52
separate models for men and women. In most similar studies attention is lim-
ited to men, because female workforce participation in most countries has been
much lower until recent years. Nonetheless, the female workforce participation
in Finland has been similar to male workforce participation already from the
1990s, which warrants doing a similar analysis also for females. Furthermore,
since both female education and female workforce participation has also in-
creased internationally, I find that calculating comparable measures for males
and females is also interesting in its own right from an international perspec-
tive. As a result, I am able to test whether there are differences in the amount
of uncertainty in career paths between men and women.
To ensure that the schooling and income equations are jointly identified,
an appropriate instrument, which affects schooling but does not appear in
the income equation, is needed. I use local differences in supply of education
proxied by the region of residence in youth as an instrument. Even though I am
able to control for a wealth of family background and individual characteristics,
endogeneity of the instrument can not be ruled out. It turns out, that even an
analysis using a possibly endogenous instrument is informative.
The association between mean earnings and its variance has been stud-
ied, among others, by Palacios-Huerta (2003), Hartog & Vijverberg (2007),
Diaz-Serrano et al. (2008a), Schweri et al. (2011), and Koerselman & Uusi-
talo (2014). The aforementioned papers do not find any robust relationship
between education group income means and variances. This might be partly
related to the fact that none of these papers address the possible selection
effects.
In addition, current paper nests two other prominent research themes.
First, I explicitly allow for heterogeneity in the return to education. In this
sense, the approach of paper is related to models used to study heterogeneous
returns to schooling (e.g. Aakvik et al. 2010, Abadie et al. 2002 and Nybom
2014). Second, the approach chosen here is tangents Cunha et al. (2005) who
study how the private information of individuals is related to their choice of
education, but do not discriminate between permanent and transitory com-
ponents. The model of Chen (2008) is also applied in Mazza & van Ophem
(2010) and Mazza et al. (2011).
As a preview of the results, I find that income uncertainty decreases up to
the tertiary level of education. University educated individuals face slightly
larger earnings uncertainty compared to people with a tertiary level education.
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For men, however, this effect is not distinguishable from zero. In addition, men
face higher income uncertainty than women regardless of their education levels.
Moreover, the estimates for the role of unobserved heterogeneity are found to
be very small compared to estimates from the U.S.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents the
details of the Finnish schooling system. Section 3.3 introduces the empirical
model. Section 3.4 presents the data used. Section 3.5 presents the first and
second stage estimates. In addition, Section 3.5 studies the robustness of the
results to relaxation of parametric assumptions. I present the uncertainty
estimates, compare them to the results acquired using data from the U.S. and
discuss how possible endogeneity of the instrument affects the interpretation
of the results in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes the paper.
3.2 Brief description of the education system in
Finland
The Finnish system of education consists of three stages. The first stage
is compulsory education (9 years), which gives eligibility to apply for a sec-
ondary education. Secondary education (3 years) is provided by academically
oriented upper secondary and vocational secondary schools. After completing
secondary education, people apply to tertiary education (3-5 years), which is
offered in universities (master’s level) and polytechnic colleges (lower tertiary
level).1
There are two stages of selection. First one takes place after comprehensive
school when students are about 16 years old. Students have an opportunity
to apply to an academically oriented upper secondary school or to a more
practically oriented vocational school. The second stage of selection takes
place when people apply for tertiary education. In addition to upper secondary
school graduates, also vocational school graduates are allowed to apply for
tertiary education.
Tertiary education is offered in universities and polytechnic colleges. The
focus of universities is research whereas polytechnic colleges are more practi-
1Finnish universities went through a degree reform in 2005. The reform re-introduced an
intermediate bachelor’s degree mandatory to all master’s level students. This reform does
affect this paper because the university graduates observed in the date were already in the
labour market by 2005.
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cally oriented. Graduates from polytechnics are able to apply to universities
to continue their studies. There are no tuition fees at any level. In addition,
a student benefit of roughly EUR 400 monthly is offered to students over 18
not living with their parents.
I use a categorical education measure, Si, with four distinct categories to
capture the salient features of the Finnish education system. Each individual
i, is placed into one of the schooling categories, which are
• Si = 1; compulsory education,
• Si = 2; secondary education (both vocational and upper),
• Si = 3; lower tertiary education,
• Si = 4; university level education.
As the data does not allow me to identify dropouts, I classify people according
to their highest completed level of education.
3.3 Empirical model
3.3.1 Model for potential incomes
This section introduces the empirical model used in this paper. The setup is
adopted from Chen (2008). It is an extension of the classic Roy (1951) model
into more than two sectors.
The stylized model consists of two periods. In the first period, individuals
choose their levels of education according to their tastes. In the second period,
they face a yearly income stream which depends on the level of education they
have chosen and get an income stream which depends on personal character-
istics (both observed and unobserved), the education level chosen and time
specific transitory and permanent shocks. I observe a panel of N workers over
T years. In the first observation year each worker has already chosen and
completed their preferred level of education. The log-income of person i with
schooling s in year t is given by
yit = y1itI (Si = 1) + y2itI (Si = 2) + y3itI (Si = 3) + y4itI (Si = 4) , (3.1)
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where I (·) is an indicator function having a value of 1 if Si = s (s = 1, 2, 3, 4)
and 0 otherwise. The potential income formulated in (3.1) gives rise to an
income regression equation of the form:
ysit = αs + xitβ + σsesi + ψstεit, ∀ Si = s. (3.2)
In (3.2), αs is the education-level specific intercept and xit is a vector of observ-
ables. The error term in (3.2) consists of two parts. Time invariant fixed effects
are incorporated in σsesi. ψstεit denotes transitory shocks, which are assumed
to be uncorrelated with both of the observable characteristics and the fixed
effect. Both error terms are standard normally distributed and the variances
permanent and transitory shocks are scaled by σs and ψst respectively.
Potential earnings variance within a schooling level in year t is therefore
σ2s +ψ
2
st. Variation in σ2s is the variance of individual specific fixed effects that
are constant in time but may vary across schooling levels. ψstεit, on the other
hand, may vary with both time and schooling level.
It is assumed, that each individual chooses her level of education according
to their preferences. This is formalized by a standard latent index model
S∗i = ziθ + vi, (3.3)
where S∗i represents the optimal level of schooling chosen by individual i.
The latent schooling factor vi is a N(0, 1) random variable. It summarizes the
private information such as taste for education and unobservable ability, which
are known to the individual but unobservable to the researcher.2 zi contains
the elements in vector xi and an instrument, which is assumed only to affect
level of education but not income.
The realized schooling level Si depends on S∗i by
Si = 1 if −∞ < ziθ + vi ≤ κ1,
...
Si = 4 if κ4 ≤ ziθ + vi <∞.
(3.4)
The cutoff value, as = κs−ziθ, is the minimal level of the unobserved schooling
factor for which individuals choose s.
2In particular, vi is assumed to capture both pecuniary and non-pecuniary utility com-
ponents.
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Model has three unobservable elements, esi, εit and vi. They are assumed
to be jointly normal with the structure esiεit
vi
 ∼ N

 00
0
 ,
 1 0 ρs0 1 0
ρs 0 1

 , (3.5)
where ρs ∈ [−1, 1] . Intuitively (3.5) implies that the unobservables in the
schooling equation may be correlated with permanent earnings differences, but
they are assumed to be uncorrelated with the transitory shocks. Therefore,
the possible selection bias only contaminates the estimation of the permanent
component. The transitory component captures macroeconomic shocks and
institutional changes which affect all individuals symmetrically and are there-
fore uncorrelated with vi. The structure of the unobservables is assumed to be
common knowledge3.
Correlation between the fixed effect and the unobserved schooling factor
ρs has a central role in the model: it captures the selection effect. If ρs > 0,
the unobservables in schooling and earnings equations are positively correlated,
the selection effect is positive and workers with high income potential get more
education. If ρs < 0, people with high income potential tend to enter labor
markets at a younger age. Consequently, ρs also governs the magnitude and
the direction of the bias in the OLS estimates: if ρs > 0, OLS overstates the
true return to education and if ρs < 0, OLS understates the true return to
education.4
From the point of view of an individual making her schooling decision, the
expected log-income is given by
E [ysit | si = s, xit, vi] = αs + xitβ + σsρsvi, (3.6)
where the term σsρsvi represents the channel through which individual school-
ing factors affect potential earnings.
3The assumption of common knowledge of shock parameters is needed for the subsequent
analysis. Even though this assumption might seem unrealistic, results from survey data (e.g.
Schweri et al., 2011 and Webbink & Hartog, 2004) and structural models (e.g. Charles &
Luoh, 2003) support the assumption that students have at least some knowledge of their
potential post-schooling income.
4Cameron & Heckman (1998) discuss, which types of economic models would rationalize
the ordered structure given by Equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5). Most importantly, they
conclude that vi has to be independent of the level of schooling, i.e. vsi = vi ∀ s.
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Since the agents are assumed to know their draw of vi, the measure of
income uncertainty should account for it. By equations 3.2 and 3.5 the uncer-
tainty for schooling level s reads as:
τ2st = V ar [σsesi + ψstεei | xit, Si = s, vi]
= σ2s
(
1− ρ2s
)
+ ψ2st. (3.7)
Equation (3.7) can be rearranged to σ2s + ψ2st = σ2sρ2s + τ2st. It shows that
the residual variance of equation (3.2) consists of two parts: unobserved het-
erogeneity (σ2sρ2s) and uncertainty (τ2st). Income uncertainty is governed by
the permanent and transitory components (σs and ψst) and the correlation
between the unobserved schooling factor and permanent component ρs.
3.3.2 Identification of variance components
Equations (3.6) and (3.7) are not directly applicable for regression analysis
because vi is unobservable. To account for the effect of unobserved vi, a multi-
choice version of the Heckman selection correction model (Heckman, 1979) is
used.
As a first stage, a latent index model (3.3) is estimated using ordered
probit. The model is used to calculate generalized residuals of the schooling
model5,
λsi =
φ (κs − ziθ)− φ (κs+1 − ziθ)
Φ (κs+1 − ziθ)− Φ (κs − ziθ) ,
where φ (·) is the probability density function of a standard normal distribu-
tion and Φ (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal
distribution. Adding λsi as a regressor to (3.6) accounts for the correlation be-
tween unobserved schooling factor and education level. The expected value of
observed earnings from the point of view of the researcher can now be written
as
E [ysit | si = s, xit, zi] = αs + xitβ + σsρsλi. (3.8)
Calculating the difference between realized and expected earnings gives
ysit − E [ysit | si = s, xit, zi] = σsesi − σsρsλi + ψstεsti, (3.9)
5In the case of a binary schooling variable, generalized residuals would reduce to Inverse
Mills’ ratios.
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whose variance reads as
V ar [ysit | si = s, xit, zi] = σs
(
1− ρ2sδsi
)
+ ψ2st (3.10)
(3.10) implies that whenever ρs 6= 0, selection leads to a truncation of the
observed income distribution which, in turn, leads to an understatement of
income variance compared to the case we would observe if education was ran-
domly assigned to individuals. The degree of understatement is given by 6:
δsi = λ
2
si −
(κs − ziθ)φ (κs − ziθ)− (κs+1 − ziθ)φ (κs+1 − ziθ)
Φ (κs+1 − ziθ)− Φ (κs − ziθ) .
The variance of transitory component can be identified from the residuals
of the within-individual model,
(yit − y¯i) = (xit − x¯i)β −
(
ξsit − ξ¯si
)
, (3.11)
where bars denote time averages of the corresponding variables (note that
time-invariant individual regressors, including λsi, are subsumed in the fixed
effects) and ξsit = ψstεsit. The procedure for estimating ψˆ2st is discussed in
detail in the Appendix.
The regression coefficients αˆs,βˆ and ˆρsσs = γˆs can be identified using a
between-individuals model
y¯si = αs + x¯iβ + γsλsi + ωi. (3.12)
The error term in (3.12) is, by equation (3.9),
ωi = σsesi + ξ¯si − γsλsi,
and its variance is
V ar [ωi | Si = s, x¯, z] = σ2s − γ2sδsi +
ψ2st
T
,
Solving this for σ2s gives the estimator for time invariant individual specific
variance of earnings for each schooling level,
σˆ2s = V̂ ar [ωi | Si = s, x¯, z] + γˆ2s ¯ˆδs −
ψ2st
T
, (3.13)
where, again, bars denote averages over individuals. The second term γˆ2s
¯ˆ
sδ in
equation (3.13) is needed to correct for the truncation of variances due to self
selection. Each term in equation (3.7) is now identified:
τˆ2st = σˆ
2
s − γˆ2s + ψˆ2st (3.14)
6λi and δi are derived in Maddala (1987) under the assumption of joint normality.
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3.4 Data
The data used in this paper is a random sample of 46321 individuals from
a Finnish Census. I limit my attention to working males and females aged
between 28 and 43. I assume that by the age of 28, people have finished
their education. An educational category of an individual is defined as the
education they have at the youngest age they are observed in the panel. It is
possible that individuals educate themselves further after the age of 28, but as
my main interest is, how well individuals are able to predict their income in
their youth, I interpret individuals’ decision to re-educate themselves at later
ages as a realized uncertainty, which should not be controlled for.7
The panel spans 1994-2009, adding up to a total of 244637 individual-year
observations for men and 213840 for women. The composition of the sample
is summarized in Table 3.1. The panel is constructed in a way that even
the youngest cohort is observed for six years. I have limited my attention to
individuals who were born after 1966 to make sure that an educational reform
which took place in Finland in the early 1970’s does not differently affect the
cohorts under study.8
The educational categories are defined according to the standard classifi-
cation of education9.
Since the goal of this paper is to study the returns to completing a degree
rather than degree major, I do not discriminate between fields of education
but only levels. The specification used allows the marginal return to schooling
to vary according to the level of schooling completed. Using the highest degree
attained also mitigates the effect of measurement errors, since years of educa-
tion are usually imputed using average years of education needed to complete
a degree, which introduces measurement error.
7In practice this is rather rare. Only roughly five percent of individuals in the lowest
education category get a higher degree during the time in the panel. For higher educa-
tion categories, the proportion of people who re-educate themselves are in the order of 1
percentage.
8The goal of this reform was to standardize the quality of comprehensive education
within the country. Consequently, people born before 1966 had a different school system
from those born after 1966. In particular, before the reform, the quality of comprehensive
education varied a great deal between regions. In addition, the reform resulted in removal
of one educational tracking stage. For details about the reform, see e.g., Pekkarinen et al.
(2009).
9Available from www.stat.fi/meta/luokitukset/koulutus/001-2010/index_en.html
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As already mentioned, the risk of unemployment constitutes a considerable
part of the total income uncertainty. Choice of the outcome variable reflects
this: dependent variable in income regressions is the log of total yearly taxable
income which, in addition to wages and entrepreneurial income, includes tax-
able income transfers but excludes income from capital gains. As a result, the
observed income streams allow for potential spells of unemployment.10 How-
ever, if a person drops out of the workforce entirely, she only contributes to the
estimation for the years when she is either unemployed or working. The vari-
ance of yearly total income is, by definition, comprised of three components,
hourly wage, hours worked and income transfers from the social insurance sys-
tem. Consequently, unless the covariances of the three components are very
large and negative, the total variances will be higher than the variance of
hourly wages (see, e.g. Abowd & Card 1989).11
Income concept may introduce a problem of its own, since not working
may be either voluntary or involuntary. To separate the involuntarily unem-
ployed from voluntary workforce non-participants I include only the observa-
tions where the main type of activity of an individual is either working or
unemployed in the estimation12. For example, if a person is on a parental
leave for one year, but is either working or unemployed for nine years, she
contributes to the estimation for the nine years when she is not on a maternity
leave.
The approach chosen leaves some (likely mis-classified) observations with
zero income. I omit these observations. This does not affect the main results,
because the proportion of zero-observations is very small (less than 2% of
observations)13. To ensure comparability between years, the measure of income
is deflated to EUR 2009 using the Consumer Price Index.
I do not have a reliable information on whether workers are part-time or
full-time. Therefore, to some extend, the uncertainty measures also reflect
10Also the (former) self-employed individuals are entitled to unemployment transfers.
11Low et al. (2010) discuss a model which separates individual productivity and firm-
worker match specific unemployment risks from one another in a structural framework.
The dependent variable in this paper, total taxable income, should be interpreted as a
combination of productivity and match specific uncertainty, but measuring the respective
contributions of these two is beyond the scope of this paper.
12In general, for an individual to be classified as unemployed (and be eligible for unem-
ployment benefits), she must agree to accept a job if offered one.
13None of the results change substantially whether I exclude them or impute a small
positive income value for these observations.
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voluntary part-time work. Nonetheless, the proportion of part-time workers in
Finland is rather small in comparison to most developed countries. The share
of part-time workers is of total work force was 9.2% for men and 16.9% for
women. Further, working part-time is virtually nonexistent in professional and
management positions (where most people likely are in education categories 3
or 4) (Eszter, 2011).
The vector of controls in Equation (3.2) includes paternal and maternal
education classified using the same four-level classification which is used for
individuals’ own education, a measure for family income calculated as the
sum the income of mother and income of father and nine dummies for family
socioeconomic status. Family background characteristics are measured at age
14 if possible. In addition, controls for first language, nationality and the
region of residence in adulthood are included.
Estimation of Equation (3.12) necessitates an instrument excluded from
the income equation (3.2). I use local differences in the supply of education
proxied by region of residence in youth as an instrument.14,15 The identify-
ing assumption is, therefore, that the region of residence is correlated with
individuals’ access to higher education but not their post-schooling income
after controlling for other observable characteristics. Consequently, I need to
exclude individuals who have no information on their place of residence at
youth. The estimation results provided in Section 5.1 support the notion that
the instrument is relevant.
As discussed by Card (1993), the place of residence in youth may affect
income because of differences in local supply of education, but also because
family background is correlated with place of residence. I control for family
background variables to account for this potential source of endogeneity. In
addition, Card points out that differences in comprehensive schooling resources
may affect subsequent income. In the case of Finland, comprehensive educa-
tion is arranged in public schools with very small differences in resources and
quality (Kirjavainen, 2009). In addition, international evidence suggests that
the impact of school quality on learning (Kramarz et al., 2009) and income
(Betts, 1995) is rather small even in the context of less standardized com-
14Childhood information is collected from censuses. Censuses were administered in 1970,
1975, 1980, 1985 and yearly from 1988 onwards.
15A similar instrument is used, among others, by Card (1993) for schooling choices in
the U.S., Bedi & Gaston (1999) for schooling choices in Honduras and Lindqvist & Vestman
(2011) for occupation choices in Sweden.
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Table 3.1: Sample sizes used in estimation.
Year of birth Sample size Sample size Year-obs. Year-obs. Years
(men) (women) (men) (women)
1966 2742 2543 38576 33335 1994-2009
1967 2696 2510 35330 30382 1995-2009
1968 2530 2501 31253 28601 1996-2009
1969 2318 2213 26752 23623 1997-2009
1970 2417 2211 25729 21475 1998-2009
1971 2118 2155 20589 19216 1999-2009
1972 2134 2056 18905 16643 2000-2009
1973 2100 1928 16462 13915 2001-2009
1974 2226 2146 15612 13739 2002-2009
1975 2492 2285 15429 12911 2003-2009
Total 23773 22548 244637 213840
prehensive schooling systems. Finally, to control for differences in local labor
market conditions in the presence of imperfect labor mobility, I control for job
location in adulthood in the income equation. Despite controlling for family
background and job location characteristics, it might still be the case that the
instrument is correlated with the outcome. If this is the case, the estimates for
ρs overestimate the true parameter value. I discuss this possibility in Section
6.
Figure 3.1 plots the estimated averages and standard deviations of log
incomes for each panel year calculated from the sample described in Table
3.2. It is apparent that the mean income rises with education. Differences in
the standard deviations of incomes are quantitatively much smaller, but some
aspects can already be noted. First, people with only a compulsory education
have the largest standard deviations of incomes. The standard deviation of
male income in the lowest education category is especially large. The relative
contribution of heterogeneity, permanent differences and transitory differences
remains unclear. Using the method outlined in the previous section, it is
possible to disentangle them from one another
Control variables, which capture the observed heterogeneity, are summa-
rized in Table 3.2. Not surprisingly, the distribution of family background
variables is virtually identical between sexes. There are larger differences in
the distribution of education levels. The proportion of men with a basic or
secondary education is larger than women. Conversely, there are more women
with at least a tertiary level education.16
16The fact that women have overtaken men in terms of their education is a common
finding in most industrialized countries (Barro & Lee, 2010).
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Figure 3.1: Means (left panel) and variances (right panel) of yearly incomes
by year for men and women.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables.
Men Women Men Women
Time invariant variables Family background
Education Father’s education
Compulsory education 0.18 0.15 Compulsory education 0.53 0.53
(0.38) (0.36) (0.5) (0.5)
Upper secondary 0.52 0.45 Upper secondary 0.25 0.25
(0.50) (0.5) (0.43) (0.43)
Lowest tertiary 0.21 0.25 Lower tertiary 0.15 0.15
(0.41) (0.43) (0.36) (0.36)
Bachelor or more 0.09 0.16 University 0.06 0.06
(0.29) (0.37) (0.24) (0.24)
First language Mother’s education
Finnish 0.950 0.951 Compulsory education 0.52 0.52
(0.218) (0.216) (0.48) (0.5)
Swedish 0.048 0.048 Upper secondary 0.31 0.31
(0.215) (0.214) (0.46) (0.46)
Other 0.002 0.001 Lowest tertiary 0.15 0.15
(0.040) (0.032) (0.36) (0.36)
Nationality Bachelor or more 0.03 0.03
Finnish 0.998 0.999 (0.17) (0.17)
(0.042) (0.032)
Other 0.002 0.001 Family income (in 100 EUR 2009) 394.23 393.401
(0.042) (0.032) (253.06) (253.01)
Average ages in years
1994 28 28
1997 30 30
2000 31 31
2003 33 33
2006 36 36
2009 39 39
Instrument for education
Region residence in youth
Uusimaa 0.20 0.21 Pohjois-Karjala 0.03 0.04
(0.40) (0.41) (0.17) (0.2)
Varsinais-Suomi 0.08 0.08 Keski-Suomi 0.05 0.05
(0.27) (0.27) (0.22) (0.22)
Satakunta 0.05 0.05 EtelÃ¤-Pohjanmaa 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Kanta-HÃ¤me 0.03 0.03 Pohjanmaa 0.04 0.03
(0.17) (0.17) (0.2) (0.17)
Pirkanmaa 0.08 0.08 Keski-Pohjanmaa 0.02 0.02
(0.27) (0.27) (0.14) (0.14)
PÃ¤ijÃ¤t-HÃ¤me 0.04 0.04 Pohjois-Pohjanmaa 0.08 0.07
(0.2) (0.2) (0.27) (0.26)
Kymenlaakso 0.04 0.04 Kainuu 0.02 0.02
(0.2) (0.2) (0.14) (0.14)
EtelÃ¤-Karjala 0.03 0.03 Lappi 0.05 0.05
(0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22)
EtelÃ¤-Savo 0.03 0.04 ItÃ¤-Uusimaa 0.02 0.02
(0.17) (0.2) (0.14) (0.14)
Pohjois-Savo 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Calculations are based on a random sample of individuals who
are born between 1966–1975 and are between 28 and 43 years old. N is the sample size of time-invariant
variables. Year-observations report the average number of years an individual is observed in the data.
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3.5 First and second stage estimates
3.5.1 First stage: schooling choice
Equation (3.3) is estimated by an ordered probit. The estimated model in-
cludes family background measures and the instrument for education. Table
3.3 shows the test statistics for the relevance of the instruments (joint sig-
nificance of the region dummies). The relevance of instrument using linear
education as the dependent variable is also reported because there are no rule-
of-thumb test statistic values for the relevance of instruments in maximum
likelihood models.
Education categories are converted to years of education using average
times-to-degree measured in full years.17 This introduces noise to the depen-
dent variable. Consequently F-statistics reported in Table 3.3 might represent
a lower bound for the effect of the instruments on education. Nonetheless, even
the F-statistics of the linear model suggest that the instruments are highly rel-
evant.
Table 3.3: Test statistics for relevance of instrument.
Men Women
Dependent variable: categorical education Likelihood ratio statistic 334.66*** 417.06***
Ordered probit [0.00] [0.00]
Dependent variable: education in years F-statistic 17.06*** 22.74***
Linear model [0.00] [0.00]
Notes: P-values in brackets. Instrument for education is the region of residence in youth. Both models
include controls for parents’ education, family income, nationality, first language and year of birth.
Significance levels in all regressions: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and . 10%.
3.5.2 Second stage: average returns to schooling
This section presents estimates for the average returns to education. The re-
ported estimates are based on the between model (3.12), where average yearly
income of an individual is regressed on individual characteristics, schooling
variable, mean age, mean age squared and the generated regressor λsi.
17These are 9 years for the compulsory level, 12 years for the secondary level, 15 for the
lower tertiary education and 17 for the master’s level education.
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To account for the fact that λsi is a generated regressor, the standard
errors are calculated using a block bootstrap procedure, where 200 samples
of size N are drawn with replacement from the original population. For each
bootstrap draw k, the estimates αˆks ,βˆk and γˆks are calculated. Expected values
and standard errors of the parameters are calculated from the distribution of
these bootstrap draws.
The parameter estimates and their standard errors are presented in the
second column of Table 3.4. The effect of education on income is nonlin-
ear with respect to level of education. Most educated individuals accrue the
highest marginal returns.
To facilitate comparability to previous literature on monetary returns to
education, also IV estimates for the average return to education are reported
in the fourth column of Table 3.4. They are reported for reference, but are not
used when estimating uncertainty parameters. The IV estimates are somewhat
larger than the corresponding estimates based on the selection model.
Without selectivity correction, the positive correlation between schooling
of individuals and the residual in the income equation would result in an
upward bias in the estimated returns to income. This bias arises if some of the
unobservable characteristics (a high draw of esi) are positively correlated with
the schooling choice of an individual. This happens, for example, if the people
with high income potential are also those who self-select into higher education
(Griliches, 1977).
In the context of the current model, the correlation between income and
schooling presents itself in positive values of the correction term γs. There
is limited evidence of this: for men the estimate of the correction terms for
lowest education categories γ1 and γ2 are positive and statistically significant.
For women, the correction term for the highest education category γ4 are
statistically significantly positive. The correction terms for other levels of
schooling are not statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional levels.
Even the correction terms that differ statistically significantly from zero are
economically rather small. 18
Quantitatively small estimate for ρˆ, suggests that the unobservable hetero-
18The fact that OLS and two-stage estimates are very close to one another, is a classic
sign of a weak instruments issue (e.g. Bound et al. 1995). Notice, however that the first
stage results point to instruments being highly relevant. The possibility that instruments
are invalid, or correlated with the outcome, is discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.
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geneity for each education level is very small. This suggests that, either, in-
dividuals have very little private information on their comparative advantages
not captured by the observable characteristics, or, alternatively, individuals do
not act on their private information on potential incomes.
A possible concern for the validity of the results of this paper is that they
hinge on the assumption of joint normality of error terms and the linear de-
pendence between mean incomes and the selection term. To shed some light
on this concern, I have performed the test described in Vella (1998, pp. 137-
138) and estimated Equation (3.12) where in addition to the Inverse Mills’
Ratio, second and third degree polynomials of the Inverse Mills’ Ratios are
used as regressors. This allows me to test for possible deviations from joint
normality of unobservables in schooling and income equations. The tests for
the joint significance of the higher order polynomial always fail to reject the
null hypothesis of linearity. This speaks in favor of the assumption of the joint
normality.
Confidence in the distributional assumptions is further strengthened by the
fact that the estimates of |ρˆ| < 1 and δˆsi ∈ [0, 1] for all individuals, which is
consistent with normality (notice that no restrictions on ρˆ and δˆ are placed).
Nonetheless, even though the assumption of normality is not immediately re-
jected, some caution should be exercised when interpreting the results, since
they obviously rely on ultimately non-testable distributional assumptions.
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Table 3.4: Second stage estimates.
Men Education categories Years of education
Education OLS Corrected for selection OLS IV
Secondary educ. 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.09*** 0.13***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Lower tertiary educ 0.47*** 0.45***
(0.01) (0.04)
University 0.74*** 0.73***
(0.01) (0.07)
Selection correction term
Compulsory educ. 0.03**
(0.01)
Secondary educ. 0.02*
(0.01)
Lower tertiary 0.01
(0.02)
Bachelor or more 0.01
(0.03)
Women Education categories Years of education
Education OLS Corrected for selection OLS IV
Secondary educ. 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Lower tertiary educ 0.37*** 0.38***
(0.01) (0.06)
University 0.77*** 0.72***
(0.01) (0.07)
Selection correction term
Compulsory educ. -0.01
(0.02)
Secondary educ. 0.00
(0.01)
Lowest tertiary 0.00
(0.01)
Bachelor or more 0.04*
(0.02)
Notes: Estimates are based on a between-individuals model. Standard errors in parenthesis. For the OLS
and IV models, standard errors are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent OLS
covariance matrix. For the selection corrected model standard errors are based on 200 bootstrap
replications. In addition to variables reported, both models include controls for parents’ education,
family income, nationality, first language and year of birth, age and age squared. In columns 1 and 2, the
education is measured as a categorical education variable. In columns 3 and 4, the education categories
are transformed into years of education using the typical time-to-education measures. Significance levels
in all specifications: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and . 10%.
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3.6 Uncertainty estimates
3.6.1 Main estimates
The estimates for the permanent and transitory components of income uncer-
tainty at each education level are reported in this section. Standard errors of
each variance component are again calculated from 200 bootstrap resamples.
The uncertainty estimates are reported in Table 3.5. Since the error structure
implies that unobserved heterogeneity is not correlated with the transitory
shocks, total earnings uncertainty is a sum of the two components: transitory
shocks and permanent earnings variance purged from the effects of private
information.
I first discuss the transitory variance estimates. Since transitory shocks
are time-varying, I start by reporting its time-means (denoted by ψ¯2s). Among
men, individuals in the lowest education group face the highest transitory in-
come shocks. People with at least a secondary level education face similar
transitory income shocks regardless of education. The estimation results are
almost entirely opposite for women: transitory shock variances are almost con-
stant among the three lowest education categories. The variances of transitory
shocks are somewhat higher in the group with the highest education compared
to other groups, even though the difference is small. The differences between
the transitory shocks of men and women are otherwise rather small, but men
with only a basic level education face the highest transitory income shocks. The
time-profile of the variance of transitory shocks can be seen from Figure 3.2;
they are rather similar between education groups and sexes, which supports
the idea that transitory income shocks are mostly driven by macroeconomic
conditions in, for example, unemployment and job turnover.
Turning to permanent income variance, I find that education decreases
permanent income differences considerably for men; having a secondary de-
gree decreases permanent income uncertainty by 23%. Permanent income
uncertainty decreases by another 15% with a tertiary level education. The
difference between lower tertiary and university level education are statisti-
cally insignificant. In total, the permanent inequality is over 35% larger for
the lowest education category in comparison to the highest education category.
The effect of education on permanent income variance is of similar magnitude
for women and men. Having a secondary level education decreases permanent
income variance by 30%. The uncertainty decreases further with a tertiary
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level education, but the differences between lower tertiary and university edu-
cation is indistinguishable from zero for men and small and positive for women.
Despite the marginal effects being similar, the level of permanent uncertainty
is considerably larger for men than women regardless of the level of educa-
tion. The differences in permanent incomes are twice as large for men than for
women in the two highest education categories. Transitory and total income
inequality levels are plotted in Figure 3.3.
To get a better grasp of the effects of education on average return and
uncertainty, Figure 3.4 plots the marginal effects of completed education on
average income and income uncertainty. Completing a secondary education
decreases income uncertainty of men more than that of women. A tertiary level
education has a small negative effect on male and female earnings uncertainty.
Completing an university level education increases uncertainty somewhat; this
effect is, however, statistically significant for men but not for women. The
returns-to-degree estimates are similar among men and women on all levels of
education.
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Table 3.5: Estimates of income variance components.
Men
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock1 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Marginal effects2 -0.02*** -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Permanent component3 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Marginal effects4 -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.00
(0.006) (0.006) (0.01)
Effect of private information on permanent component5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Total wage uncertainty6 0.26*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Marginal effects7 -0.06*** -0.02*** 0.01
(0.006) (0.006) (0.01)
Women
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock1 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Marginal effect2 -0.002 -0.002* 0.005**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Permanent component3 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Marginal effect4 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01
(0.005) (0.003) (0.01)
Effect of private information on permanent component5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Total wage uncertainty6 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.13***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Marginal effect7 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01
(0.004) (0.003) (0.05)
1 ψ¯2s
2 ψ¯2s − ψ¯2s−1
3 σ2s
4 σ2s - σ
2
s−1
5 γ2s
6 ψ¯2s − γ2s + σ2s = τ2s
7 τ2s − τ2s−1
Notes: Variance component decompositions are based on Equation (3.13) with region of residence in
youth as an instrument. Standard errors from 200 bootstrap resamples in parenthesis. Education
categories are: 1. compulsory education; 2. secondary education; 3. lowest tertiary education; 4. bachelor
level education or higher. Significance levels in all specifications: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and . 10%.
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Figure 3.2: Transitory shock variances year by year.
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sent 95% confidence intervals calculated by bootstrap. Education categories
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Figure 3.4: Marginal effects of completing a degree on mean income (horizon-
tal axis) and uncertainty (vertical axis) for men (black symbols) and women
(gray symbols). The dashed lines represent the bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals of return and uncertainty estimates on the corresponding axes.
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3.6.2 Comparison to U.S. studies
My uncertainty estimates differ from those obtained in Chen (2008). Complet-
ing an education is found to decrease income uncertainty at lower education
levels, but the effect is close to zero or even marginally positive for univer-
sity graduates, whereas Chen’s results suggest a U-shaped profile of income
uncertainty where the highest and lowest education categories face the high-
est income uncertainty. Chen conjectures that the high income uncertainty of
university graduates is related to the fact that they are able to choose their
occupations from a wider pool of potential occupations, which is also reflected
in their permanent income differences. It is possible that also Finnish uni-
versity graduates are able to choose their occupations from a wider pool, but
their income uncertainty is still smaller than that of lower educated individ-
uals. It seems plausible that this is due to smaller risk of unemployment of
more educated individuals.
Perhaps a more surprising finding is the very small unobserved heterogene-
ity. This is in stark contrast to the estimates based on data from the U.S.19
For example, Cunha & Heckman (2007) conclude that up to 50% of the ex
post variance in income of college graduates is attributable to unobserved het-
erogeneity, i.e. is foreseeable by individuals making their choice on whether
or not to attend college. A potential explanation for the results is the choice
of measure of income. The studies based on U.S. data use either long period
average earnings (Cunha & Heckman, 2007), or average hourly wage (Chen,
2008), which both arguably contain less variation than the yearly total in-
come. Therefore, the correlation between residuals in schooling and income
equations, which is used to identify unobserved heterogeneity, is mechanically
smaller in absolute value.
A second partial explanation is that I target people in their youth. As the
nine-year comprehensive school is mandatory, it may indeed be the case that
young people making their choice on whether or not to attend higher educa-
tion have limited information on their future incomes at the age of fifteen. In
addition, early-career earnings are usually more volatile, or more uncertain.
19Mazza et al. (2011) attempts to replicate the results in Chen (2008) using the same
data but a different instrument, but they get very different results. In particular, their
estimates for the unobserved heterogeneity are almost indistinguishable from zero regardless
of education level and that the length of education and uncertainty are positively correlated.
The same model applied to British data shows uncertainty decreasing with education and
very small unobserved heterogeneity, while German data do not fit the model at all.
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Since the Finnish comprehensive education is extremely standardized and al-
lows for little differentiation in school curricula between skill groups, it may
convey less private information to students about their future incomes and,
therefore lead to a smaller unobserved heterogeneity, than a less standardized
system would.20
However, even though the unobserved heterogeneity is found to be smaller
than in the U.S., this does not necessarily imply that people would have less
information on their potential future income streams. Rather, it seems plausi-
ble, that, given the high amount of redistribution and collective bargaining in
the Finnish labor market, people would have a rather good perception on their
potential future income, but this perception is not correlated with individual
characteristics which are unobservable to the econometrician.
3.6.3 Sensitivity of results to the instrument
Even though I control for a variety of background characteristics in both the
first and second stages, the validity of the instrument is somewhat question-
able. It is possible that the instrument has a direct effect on income even after
controlling for the elements of x.
To test for this possibility, I do a following falsification test suggested in
Bound et al. (1995): I test for the effect of instrument on income in subsamples
where the schooling is held constant. If the instruments are valid, they should
have no predictive power on income after controlling for x. The tests for the
joint significance of instruments are implemented separately for each schooling
category and both sexes and reported in Table 3.6. The instrument is found
to have a direct effect on earnings in comprehensive schooling category for men
and in the secondary education category for women. Consequently, for other
education levels, the exogenous instrument assumption is retained. 21
To further study, to what extent the possible endogeneity of instrument
drives the results, I have estimated the model without an exclusion restriction
20This explanation is consistent Nybom (2014) whose results suggest a rather small effect
of unobserved heterogeneity on returns to schooling in Sweden.
21Also the IV estimates are somewhat larger than previous estimates from Finland (Uusi-
talo 1999). It should, however, be noted, that the earnings measures are not entirely com-
parable because the measure used in this paper consists of a compilation of earnings and
unemployment risks. If education increases earnings and decreases the probability of being
unemployed (and increases hours worked within a year), this would lead to higher mean
return to education.
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relying solely on the assumed nonlinearity of the Inverse Mill’s Ratios for
identification. The estimation results are presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.
The results are very similar to those reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Since
the two alternative specifications give very similar, and quantitatively small,
estimates for the unobserved heterogeneity, it seems that the results are not
driven by the choice of the instrument.
The approaches presented in this subsection do not present a conclusive
test for the validity of the instrument, rather they should be seen as sugges-
tive evidence that the possible correlation between the instruments and the
unobservable element of the earnings education is not driving any of the main
results.
Table 3.6: Test for the exogeneity of the instrument.
Men Women
Comprehensive education 1.67* 0.77
(19, 3869) (19, 2482)
[0.04] [0.75]
Secondary education 1.399 1.47.
(19, 12087) (19, 9030)
[0.11] [0.09]
Lower tertiary education 1.38 1.30
(19,4914) (19, 7633)
[0.13] [0.18]
University education 0.61 1.09
(19,2075) (19, 2530)
[0.91] [0.36]
F-tests for the for the joint significance of instruments
in samples with the same education. P-values in brackets, degrees of freedom in parenthesis. Significance
levels in all specifications: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and . 10%.
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Table 3.7: Second stage estimates (estimated without an exclusion restriction).
Men Education categories
Return to education level Corrected for selection Selection correction term
Upper secondary educ. 0.25*** Comprehensive educ 0.00
(0.05) (0.01)
Lower tertiary educ 0.47*** Upper secondary educ. 0.00
(0.05) (0.01)
University 0.73*** Lower tertiary educ 0.00
(0.07) (0.02)
University 0.03*
(0.02)
Women Education categories
Return to education level Corrected for selection Comprehensive educ 0.00
Upper secondary educ. 0.20*** (0.02)
(0.05) Upper secondary educ. 0.00
Lower tertiary educ 0.39*** (0.01)
(0.05) Lower tertiary educ 0.00
University 0.74*** (0.01)
(0.06) University 0.02
(0.02)
Notes: Estimates are based on a model without an instrument. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard
errors are based on 200 bootstrap replications. In addition to variables reported, both models include
controls for location of residence, parents’ education and family income, nationality, first language and
year of birth, age and age squared. Significance levels in all specifications: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and .
10%.
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Table 3.8: Estimates of income variance components (estimated without an
exclusion restriction).
Men
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock1 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Permanent component2 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Effect of private information on permanent component3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
Total wage uncertainty4 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.18
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Women
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock1 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Permanent component2 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.05
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Effect of private information on permanent component3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Total wage uncertainty4 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.14
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
1 ψ¯2s
2 σ2s
3 γ2s
4 ψ¯2s − γ2s + σ2s = τ2s
Notes: Variance component decompositions are based on Equation (3.13) estimated without an
instrument. Standard errors from 200 bootstrap resamples in parenthesis. Education categories are: 1.
compulsory education; 2. upper secondary education; 3. lowest tertiary education; 4. bachelor level
education or higher.
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3.7 Conclusions
This paper applies a simple model for identifying potential income distribu-
tions. The model is based on the residuals of the income regression equation.
Variance of residuals is comprised of two components: uncertainty and unob-
served heterogeneity. The uncertainty is further comprised of two components:
permanent income differences and transitory shocks. Using a parametric model
for selection, this paper disentangles the role of unobserved heterogeneity from
permanent income differences. This paper departs from previous studies in two
ways: in addition to wages, measure of income also includes transfers to people
who are not working. This gives a possibility also to include the unemployed
in the estimation allowing for a more complete picture of income uncertainty.
Second, to facilitate understanding of differences in the earnings processes of
men and women, separate models for men and women are estimated.
The results indicate that education is a good investment: in addition to
having higher mean income, more educated individuals have smaller perma-
nent income differences and face smaller transitory income shocks, even after
correcting for selection. Moreover, my results indicate that men face consider-
ably riskier income processes. For example, uncertainty for men with a basic
level education is about 33% higher than that of women with a similar educa-
tion. The results show that the higher male income variance is by and large
driven by permanent earnings differences; no differences in unobserved het-
erogeneity are found. In addition, transitory shocks affect both genders and
almost all education groups symmetrically. Only men in the lowest education
category face larger transitory earnings shocks.
The estimates on share of unobserved heterogeneity in permanent income
differences are quantitatively very small. This is a stark difference from pre-
vious studies, which mostly use data from the U.S. and find that the effect of
unobserved heterogeneity may be up to 50% of permanent income differences.
I argue that this result is likely driven by the choice of dependent variable
or the relatively young estimation sample. Both of these factors increase the
noise in the dependent variable compared to specifications typically used in
studies using data from the U.S.
The estimation method applied in this paper take advantage of observed
choices made by individuals to infer their information sets and, consequently,
unobserved heterogeneity. A possible caveat in the analysis, is that if people
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know their expected incomes, but do not act on this information, the method
which is based on their observed choices necessarily understates the unobserved
heterogeneity. This may be a particularly relevant concern in the case of
Finland, where higher education is entirely publicly funded.
The focus of this paper has been to quantify the effect of education on
earnings uncertainty but the specific channel through which education affects
earnings uncertainty is somewhat unclear. A classic explanation (e.g. Willis
& Rosen, 1979) is that each level of education gives access to a distinct labor
market with distinct income processes. In addition, education has been shown
to have a variety of other positive effects on behavior (see Grossman, 2005
for a review). For example, it leads to better health (Lleras-Muney, 2005)
and reduces antisocial behavior (Lochner, 2004). Furthermore, these effects
are found to be more relevant to men than to women. It is plausible, that
at least a portion of the high earnings uncertainty of low educated males is
attributable to these behavioral factors.
Since correcting for selection has only a small effect on the estimates of
means and variances of incomes conditional on education level, it appears
that, in the case of Finland, not correcting for selection has only a marginal
impact on the estimated returns to education and uncertainty involved.
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Appendix: Estimating ψˆ2st from the residuals of the
within-model
Equation (3.11):
(yit − y¯i) = (xit − x¯i)β −
(
ξsit − ξ¯si
)
.
Assuming that observations are missing at random and that εst and εst−k
are independent for all k 6= 0, the residual variance can be written as
V ar
(
ξsit − ξ¯si
)
= Wst =
(
1− 2
T
)
ψ2st +
Ωsi
T 2i
,
where Ti is number of observation years of observation i and Ωsi =
∑Ti
t=1 ψ
2
st.
Summing both sides up over t gives
Ti∑
t=1
Wst =
(
1− 2
T
)
Ωsi +
Ωsi
T
and solving this for Ωsi gives
Ωsi =
∑Ti
t=1Wst(
1− 1
T
) .
Plugging this back to the expression of V ar (νsti − ν¯si) and solving for ψ2st
gives
ψ2st = Wst
Ti
Ti − 2 −
Ωst
Ti (Ti − 2) .
Finally, replacing Ti’s with their sample average and Wst with its consistent
estimate gives
ψˆ2st = Wˆst
T¯
T¯ − 2 −
Ωˆs
T¯
(
T¯ − 2) ,
where Ωˆs =
∑Ti
t=1 Wˆst(
1− 1
T¯
) .
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Chapter 4
How Risky Is the Choice of a
University Major?
Abstract
This paper estimates the monetary returns to different university
majors and the risks related to them. The residuals from a Mincer-type
income regression are decomposed into unobserved heterogeneity (known
to the individual when making her education choice) and risk (unknown
to the individual). The return and risk estimates are corrected for se-
lection by applying the selection correction model of Lee (1983) and an
instrument based on the local supply of education in different majors.
The differences in risks between different majors are found to be mostly
statistically insignificant but differences in returns to majors are larger
and significant. Both, income uncertainty and mean returns are found
to be larger for men than for women.
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4.1 Introduction
Human capital assets are perhaps the most important form of investments
made by individuals. In a standard human capital accumulation framework,
individuals invest time (and possible tuition fees) in their education and the
potential return to education materializes as higher future earnings.
Since the returns to human capital are uncertain and they are realized
only several years after the choice of education is made, there is an inherent
uncertainty in human capital investments. This paper studies the risk-return
association of a particular type of human capital assets, namely university level
degrees from different majors.
There are considerable differences in earnings of people who have gradu-
ated from different majors. For instance, the raw mean earnings of people
who major in medicine are roughly 60% higher than those of arts majors. In
addition, there are differences in unemployment risks and earnings variances
across fields. However, it is not clear, if the differences are due to the fact that
different people choose to major in different fields or differences in majors as
such.1
This paper answers two interrelated questions. First, I study how much
different university majors differ in their return. In addition, I study if there
are differences in the earnings uncertainty related to these majors.
Comparing monetary returns of major subjects is complicated by the fact
that people self-select into their major subjects. Therefore, it remains unclear
whether the earnings differences between particular fields are due to different
types of education or due to differences in observable (e.g. school grades and
family background) or unobservable characteristics (e.g. abilities, motivation,
taste for risk) between individuals who choose different majors. This unob-
served heterogeneity may bias estimates for mean returns to major subjects
upwards or downwards.2 The unobserved heterogeneity also complicates the
1A pioneer in the literature studying the risk-return nexus of human capital investments
is Palacios-Huerta (2003) who studies the risk-return trade-off in education levels and com-
pares them to financial investments. Christiansen et al. (2007) take a similar approach,
but they study majors in addition to levels. Relatedly, Hartog & Vijverberg (2007) and
Diaz-Serrano et al. (2008) study the association of mean income and higher moments of
the income distribution between education groups. None of these papers explicitly model
selection into education.
2Willis & Rosen (1979) formulate a structural model for selection into education and
study how the selection biases the estimated returns to college education. Card (2001)
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estimation of variances. This is because the realized dispersion in observed
earnings is a result of two distinct components: an unexpected permanent
income shock and unobserved heterogeneity across workers.3
Self-selected education causes the returns to a major to differ from the re-
turn we would expect to observe if the education was randomly allocated. To
understand the effect of self-selection into a major subject, I correct for selec-
tion when estimating income premia and uncertainty related to major choice
using the multinomial selectivity correction of Lee (1983) and a parametric
assumption on the distribution of unobservables. I model each major as a
distinct ”market” which gives rise to a distinct earnings process.
The measure of uncertainty in this paper is the ex ante variance of earnings.
It is the variance of earnings that is not captured by observable characteristics
or unobserved heterogeneity, which is inferred from agents’ choices. I decom-
pose the ex ante variance into two components: a time-invariant permanent
component and a transitory component which reflects idiosyncratic shocks to
their income streams.4 The transitory component is allowed to vary with time
and with education. Ths unobserved heterogeneity is identified from the ac-
tual education choices made by the agent. This paper studies an unordered
multinomial education choice (choice of major) rather than an ordered one
(high school versus college).5
The model presented in this paper is estimated using Finnish registry data.
surveys problems that arise due to unobservable characteristics, which affect both selection
into education and the returns to it, and discusses solutions to these problems.
3Cunha et al. (2005) and Chen (2008) model the selection into education and decompose
permanent income differences within an education level into unobserved heterogeneity and
uncertainty using U.S. data on levels of education. The main focus of Cunha et al. (2005)
is the distribution of returns of a college education, whereas Chen (2008) studies the po-
tential variances of different levels of education corrected for selectivity effects and makes a
distinction between permanent income variance and transitory income shocks.
4The measure of earnings risk is rather standard in the literature, but it disregards the
higher moments of the income distribution. In particular, it has been shown that gamblers
may be risk-averse but skew-loving at the same time (e.g. Golec & Tamarkin 1998). Further
Hartog & Vijverberg (2007) show that high variance is positively correlated with income
and higher skew is negatively correlated with income when comparing different majors in
their data. These are consistent with the fact that workers dislike risk but are attracted to
positive skew when choosing their occupation.
5In a recent working paper, Reyes et al. (2013) present a model of (an unordered)
university choice which features observed and unobserved heterogeneity and their effect on
early career wages using Chilean data. Also Napari (2008) estimates field specific returns to
higher education using Finnish data but does not model selection into majors.
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An attractive feature of the Finnish tax code for the current purposes is that
virtually all of the income transfers, including unemployment benefits are tax-
able and are therefore observed in the tax registry. Therefore, the biases
inherent in survey based approaches are not an issue in the current paper.
The results of this paper also have policy relevance. The perceived risk-
iness of some human capital investments is a subject of an on-going debate
on the financing of higher education. For example, a claim persists that cer-
tain fields of education have such an inherent risk involved that without large
subsidies for schooling, no one would choose those majors. By deriving major
subject specific income uncertainty measures corrected for selection, this paper
provides a test for differences in riskiness of different majors.
Estimating a selection model necessitates an instrument, which affects only
the probability of graduating with a degree from a given major, but does not
affect potential post-graduation earnings. To construct the instrument, I take
advantage of an institutional feature in Finnish tertiary education. Namely, in
Finland students apply directly to a university-major combination. Universi-
ties have strict quotas for how many students they accept each year for each
major. These quotas define how competitive the admission to each university-
major combination is and, consequently, how difficult it is to be admitted to
study a given subject in a given university. For example, since the ratio of ap-
plicants to starting places is higher in medicine in Oulu compared to medicine
in Helsinki, an upper secondary school graduate in Oulu is more likely to
be admitted to study and to eventually graduate from medicine compared to
an upper secondary school graduate from Helsinki. Even though upper sec-
ondary school graduates from Helsinki may apply to Oulu and vice versa, this
mobility incurs both monetary and psychic moving costs, which make people
reluctant to move. The exclusion restriction builds on the assumption that,
for a marginal student, these moving costs matter so much that they affect
their tertiary education choices.
Majority of papers studying monetary return to education use either hourly
wages of workers or mean incomes over a long period of time as a dependent
variable. This approach disregards one of the most important source of earn-
ings uncertainty; namely, the risk of unemployment. Instead of hourly wages,
this paper studies yearly total taxable income, which, in addition to income
from employment, includes unemployment benefits and other taxable trans-
fers. This measure gives a more complete picture of the income uncertainty
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related to a level of education. Using total taxable income as the measure of
income also mitigates the problem of endogenous selection into employment,
as people are observed even if they are not working.
I estimate separate models for men and women. In most of the comparable
studies attention is limited to men, because female workforce participation in
most countries has been much lower until recent years. Nonetheless, female
workforce participation in Finland has been very high as early as the 1990s,
which warrants doing a similar analysis also for females. Furthermore, since
both female education and female workforce participation has also increased
internationally, I find that calculating comparable measures for males and
females is also interesting in its own right from an international perspective.
In addition, I am able to test whether there are differences in the uncertainty
of career paths between men and women.
As a preview of the results, I find that the differences in the returns to
majors are found to be far greater than the differences in risks associated
with them. Further, the proportion of unobserved heterogeneity is found to
be statistically indistingquishable from zero for most majors. This, in turn,
suggests that the differences in returns to majors outweigh the differences in
risks associated with them.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses data; sample
construction, descriptive statistics, grouping of major subjects, the definition
of concept and the instrumental variables. Section 4.3 describes the empir-
ical model. Section 4.4 discusses the first and second stage estimates. The
uncertainty estimates are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the
paper.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Sample construction and observables
The data used in this paper is based on longitudinal census data collected by
Statistics Finland. It contains rich information on individuals’ educational at-
tainment, income, mother tongue, and region of residence and on their parental
socioeconomic status (based on the occupation of both parents) and education
(highest level of education of both parents); it spans the years 1990-2006.
Table 4.1 gives the descriptive statistics for the main explanatory variables.
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In addition to demographic and income information, the data has been
linked to matriculation examination grades for years 1990-1995. Finnish upper
secondary school graduates all take part in a standardized examination, which
gives students a general qualification to apply for universities and vocational
colleges. The examination is centrally administered and graded according to
uniform criteria across the country and the results are scaled so that they are
comparable across years.
There are four compulsory exams in the matriculation examination: mother
tongue, the second official language, one foreign language and either mathe-
matics or a science and arts exam. In addition, students may take exams in
other foreign languages and take both the mathematics and the science and
arts option. Finally, there are two alternatives versions of the mathematics
exam; a basic level exam and an advanced level exam. Generally, to be ac-
cepted to study a mathematically oriented major in the university, students
have to have taken the advanced level exam in mathematics.
The data used in this paper includes four measures related to the matric-
ulation examination. I observe the average grade of all tests taken (general
grade). In addition, I observe grades in mother tongue and in mathematics.
Finally, there is an indicator for whether a student has taken the basic level
or the advanced level exam in mathematics. The exams are graded on a scale
of 0-5, where 0 indicates a failed exam.6
I consider the matriculation examination grades as a rather good measure
for general academic ability for two reasons. First, it is a standardized test
which has a central role in the university admissions, so matriculation exam
is a high-stakes exam. In addition, it is taken by all upper secondary school
graduates regardless of whether they are planning to apply to tertiary educa-
tion or not, so the grading does not suffer from selection bias. The proportions
of different degrees vary between males and females in the data. For instance,
technology is clearly a male-dominated field and arts a female-dominated field.
Three notes can be already made from the descriptive data. First, the
university graduates earn more than the non-graduates. Further, they have
less work experience, and are more academically able as evidenced by their
matriculation examination grades.
6The grades are given on an ordinal scale as Latin words from improbatur (fail; 0) to
laudatur (excellent; 5).
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4.2.2 Classification of majors
To make sure that each major cell has enough observations. I have pooled the
education majors into five fairly homogenous categories. These are:
• S = 0; Upper secondary level education,
• S = 1; Arts, education and social sciences,
• S = 2; Law,
• S = 3; Business,
• S = 4; Engineering and natural sciences, and
• S = 5; Medicine and pharmacy.
Pooling the majors in the aforementioned fashion reduces the number of pa-
rameters to be estimated, and therefore reduces the complexity of the model
considerably.7 The pooling of categories is, to some extent, arbitrary. Nonethe-
less, categories are homogenous with respect to their matriculation exami-
nation grades and mean incomes after graduation.8 Nonetheless, if there is
heterogeneity within the categories, this will interfere with the uncertainty es-
timates. The schooling S = 0 is used as a reference group to which all other
higher education majors are compared to.
I also do a second simplification. Namely, I restrict the return to a major
to be the same across different universities. I do this because the data does not
have information on the actual institution from which people have graduated
but only their place of residence at the time of graduation. To control for
regional earnings differences, I include dummies for the region of residence at
the time of graduation in the earnings regression.
7I have excluded fine arts graduates from the model because of the very small sample
size in those subjects.
8Each major category consists of several major subjects. I tested if the major subject
specific means of income and matriculation examination grade variables differed from one
another within each grouped major category. The null hypothesis of same means was not
rejected for any of these variables within a major at 5 % risk level.
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I classify people according to their tertiary degrees and exclude decisions
related to post-tertiary education (for example, an engineer who has later com-
pleted a doctoral degree in the arts is classified as an engineer). Furthermore,
I limit my attention to people who have either completed a university level
master or a bachelor level degree or, alternatively, have not finished any post-
secondary degree, who are used as comparison group. Because I only have
information on completed degrees, I classify university drop-outs as upper sec-
ondary school graduates. Finally, I exclude people with a vocational tertiary
education. This exclusion is done because the selection into vocational tertiary
education is less standardized and consequently more difficult to measure.
4.2.3 Measure of income
I observe the individuals for the time period between the years 1990 and 2006. I
limit my attention to people who had completed their secondary level education
between 1990 and 1995. For the people who have a post-secondary degree, I
include only the earnings observations past their graduation. Further, I exclude
observations where people are classified as students, retired or outside of the
workforce.
The outcome variable in income regressions is the log of total yearly taxable
income which, in addition to wages, includes taxable income transfers. As a
result, the observed income streams allow for spells of unemployment. This
reflects the fact that the risk of unemployment constitutes a considerable part
of total income uncertainty. However, if a person drops out of the workforce
entirely, she only contributes to the estimation for the years for which she is
part of the workforce. This income concept may introduce a problem of its
own, since unemployment may be voluntary or involuntary. To separate these
from one another, solely individual-year observations where the main type of
activity of an individual is either working or unemployed are included in the
estimation9. The approach chosen leaves some observations with zero income.
I exclude these observations. This does not affect the main results, because the
share of zero-observations is very small (less than 1% of yearly observations)10.
9In general, for an individual to be classified as unemployed (and be eligible for unem-
ployment benefits), she must agree to accept a job if offered one.
10None of the results qualitatively change whether I exclude them or replace the zero
observations with a small positive income value.
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To ensure comparability between years, the measure of income is deflated to
EUR 2006 using the Consumer Price Index.
It should already be noted that the people in the sample are, on average,
rather young and at the beginning of their careers. Therefore, the earnings of
individuals are observed from the beginning of their career. This may drive
some of the results, but I still perceive the findings as indicative of the earnings
uncertainty faced by recent university graduates.
4.2.4 Exclusion restriction
To ensure that the joint identification of schooling choice and earnings equa-
tions is not solely based on functional form assumptions, I utilize an instru-
ment, which is assumed to monotonously affect the probability of choosing a
particular major subject, but not to affect the earnings after graduation.
Since post-secondary education is state sponsored in Finland, there are no
cost side instruments available. Instead, I use a proxy measure for local supply
of education as an instrument. Local supply of education is measured by the
ratio of annual number of starting places to applicants at region level for each
major11. There are some regions with more than one study program offering
the same major (e.g., Finnish and Swedish language universities in Varsinais-
Suomi and Uusimaa). For these regions, an average of applicants-to-places
ratio weighted by the number of starting places is calculated. For the regions
that do not have a university or a program in a particular major, an average
of applicants-to-places ratio weighted by the distance to each university region
where one can study each major is calculated. The supply is measured in the
year of matriculation at region level.12
The admission to university is based on a combination of the matriculation
examination grades and the university entrance exams. It is merit-based and
objective. In particular, there is no minority support or weight for extra-
curricular activities. Different majors and universities give different relative
weights to different subjects in the matriculation exam. Generally, the more
competitive a major is, the more weight is given to the entrance examination
relative to the matriculation examination.
11Finland is divided into 20 administrative regions, which are the regional cultural and
administrative divisions.
12These data are downloaded from the KOTA database maintained by the Ministry of
education: https://kotaplus.csc.fi/ (downloaded 2013-01-08).
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The supply of education may be correlated with the outcome through some
other channels beside its effect on choice of majors, which would threaten the
validity of the instrument. As discussed by Card (1993), this may happen
because families living in university regions have different educational or social
backgrounds than families living in non-university regions. I address this worry
by controlling for a variety of family background variables. Card’s critique
is also likely less valid in the context of this paper because it seems much
less likely that parental characteristics would be correlated with a supply in
particular major compared to supply of general university education.
In addition, there might be differences in upper secondary school quality
between regions. This might affect both the education choice and subsequent
earnings of individuals, which might threaten the validity of the instrument.
This is a small concern in the case of Finland because the secondary education
is arranged in public schools with a standardised curriculum, very small dif-
ferences in resources and quality. Furthermore, since the matriculation exam-
ination is standardized and centrally administered, it is reasonable to assume
that controlling for matriculation examination grades would control also for
differences in the quality of secondary education.
A third possible source of omitted variable bias is that the location of
residence at the time of graduation from upper secondary school might be cor-
related with both the choice of university major and labour market conditions
after graduating, which, in turn, would create a correlation between the instru-
ment and the outcome. I address this concern by controlling for the region of
residence at the time of graduation from upper secondary school in the earn-
ings equation.13 Finally, I assume that yearly changes in starting places are
so small in magnitude that they do not have any general equilibrium effects.
The instrument distributions are plotted in figure 4.1 in a box-whiskers
plot for each year14. The medians are the smallest for law, and largest for
science and engineering. Further, as evidenced by the interquartile ranges
of the instrument, the variation between regions is largest in business and
13It would also be possible to include region of residence dummies from the year of
observation in the outcome equation. This would increase the precision of the estimates.
However, since the region of residence is determined after the choice of education has been
made, it is potentially endogenous.
14In each of the plots, the strong black lines mark yearly medians for each year; boxes
represent the interquartile range between 25th and 75th quantiles, and whiskers represent
1.5 times the interquartile range. Observations lying outside of the whiskers are marked as
dots.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of the instruments.
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technology, and the smallest in arts. In addition, the box-and-whiskers plots
reveal that for all majors there is both time and cross-sectional variation, which
helps in identification of the model.
Further, for the identification of the choice model, the instruments should
also have some independent variation and not simply act as proxies for living
in a university region. To show that this is the case, I report the correlation
matrix of instruments in Table 4.2. The correlations are considerably smaller
than 1 ranging from .085 to .512 which supports the assumption that the
instruments truly capture differences between university regions.
Table 4.2: Covariance matrix of starting places to applicants in fields.
Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio
in major 1 in major 2 in major 3 in major 4 in major 5
Ratio in major 1 1 0.422 0.502 0.461 0.512
Ratio in major 2 1 0.466 0.085 0.377
Ratio in major 3 1 0.486 0.298
Ratio in major 4 1 0.450
Ratio in major 5 1
Notes: Ratio is calculated as starting places divided by number of applicants to each major. The major
subjects are 1: arts, education, social science; 2: Law; 3: Business; 4: Engineering and science and 5:
Health.
4.3 Empirical model
In this section, I present the selection correction methodology of Lee (1983)
applied to the context of major choices.
4.3.1 Selecting into major and income processs
The model features an unordered schooling decision. Conditional on observed
and unobserved characteristics, agents make their major choice based on the
comparison of the expected utility associated with each major subject. This
utility includes both monetary and non-monetary benefits as well as mone-
tary and psychic costs. I assume that the earnings processes of individuals
are determined by the agent’s observed and unobserved characteristics plus a
permanent earnings shock and a yearly transitory shock, both of which may
depend on the choice of education made by the agent. In essence, I allow for
observationally similar individuals to have different realizations for the return
to completing a degree. I interpret the variance of these returns as uncertainty
related to the choice of education.
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The stylized model consists of two stages. In stage one, each high school
graduate chooses their preferred major subject or, alternatively, enters the
labour market with a high school education. In the second stage, university
graduates enter the labour market and face income streams which are deter-
mined by major specific mean incomes, permanent earnings differences and
transitory shocks. There are N individuals who are observed over T periods
and have to make the their education choice over alternatives Si = 0, 1, ...,M .
The log total income of individual i with education s in year t is given by
ysti = αs + xtiβ + σsesi + ψstεsti, (4.1)
where αs is a major specific intercept and xit is a vector of observables.xti is
a vector of control variables, which includes year of birth, parental education,
socioeconomic status, mother tongue dummies, and matriculation examination
grades from mathematics, mother tongue, the mean of all examination grades
and a dummy variable which indicates whether the students have completed a
basic or an advanced syllabus in mathematics. In addition, I include a measure
for potential experience and its square. It is calculated as the difference of the
observation year and the year of graduation.
The error term of (4.1) consists of two uncorrelated standard normal com-
ponents, with [
esi
εsti
]
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
1 0
0 1
])
.
The variances of two independent shocks are scaled by σs and ψst.
esi captures the time-invariant earnings potential for major s. σsesi are
allowed to be correlated with the observable characteristics xit. The term εsti,
on the other hand, captures the transitory income shocks, which are assumed
to be uncorrelated with the other terms in (4.1).
The potential problem of selection arises because agents’ major choices and
their earnings potential in the major might be correlated with one another. I
formalize the selection into education as a multinomial selection model of Lee
(1983). Denote the utility individual i from choice s as
Vsi = zsiγs + ηsi,
where the vector zi = (z1i, . . . , zMi) includes all time-invariant components
of xi, and a major-specific instrument which is assumed to only affect the
102
choice of major, but not the monetary returns of graduating from a major.
I assume that the error terms ηsi in the utility functions are identically and
independently Gumbel distributed, and independent of zsi. The error terms
ηs capture the private information related to agents’ major choice, such as
motivation, tastes, and the unobserved ability.
Agents choose major s if and only if
Vsi > Vji, ∀ j 6= s,
which is equivalent to
zsiγs + ηs > zjiγj + ηj , ∀ j 6= s
⇔ maxj {zjiγj − zsiγs + ηs − ηj} < 0, ∀ j 6= s
⇔ νsi < Φ−1 (PSi) ,
where νsi ∼ N(0, 1), and
PSi = P (Si = s | zi) = exp (zsiγs)∑M
j=1 exp (zjiγj)
. (4.2)
It is further assumed that the joint distribution of the transformed variable
νsi and esi is bivariate standard normal with a correlation coefficient ρs. Now
the analysis of Heckman (1979) (which relies on the joint normality of error
terms) can be applied to the transformed random variable νsi.
Under these assumptions, the expected earnings of an individual who has
chosen s, read as
E [ysti | Si = s, xti, zti] = E [ysti | zsiγs > νsi, xti, zti]
= αs + xtiβ − σsρsλs(zi), (4.3)
= αs + xtiβ − µsλs(zs), (4.4)
where
λs(zi) =
φ
(
Φ−1 (Psi)
)
Psi
,
and µs = σsρs.
Selection also implies that the observed earnings distribution is truncated,
and its variance reads as:
V ar [ysti | Si = s, xti, zti] = V ar [σsesi + ψstεsti | zsiγs > νsi, xti, zti]
= σ2s(1− ρ2sδsi) + ψ2st, (4.5)
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where
δsi =
(
Φ−1 (Psi) + λs(zi)
)
λs(zi)
gives the degree of understatement of the observed earnings variance compared
to potential earnings variance, which would be observed if the education was
randomly assigned15.
Equation (4.3) captures the observed earnings given that agents have cho-
sen s. In particular, it demonstrates, that if µs 6= 0, not correcting for selection
will give biased estimates for the returns to each major.
τst = V ar (σsesi + ψstεsti | η0i, . . . , ηSi, xti, zi) = σ2s
(
1− ρ2s
)
+ ψ2st (4.6)
is the unforeseeable component of the earnings residual, or earnings uncer-
tainty, which is corrected for selection and truncation.
The uncertainty related for each major in expression(4.6) consists of two
parts. The first term is the permanent component net of unobserved het-
erogeneity, and the second component is the yearly-varying transitory shock.
Equation (4.6) also directly implies that whenever ρs 6= 0, observed earnings
inequality is smaller than the potential earnings inequality, which we would
observe if the major subjects were randomly assigned.
Further, it is worth noting, that the difference between expressions (4.5)
and (4.6) is that (4.5) captures the observed variance of earnings conditional on
observables, and (4.6) captures the potential variance, which we would observe
major subjects were randomly assigned.
4.3.2 Identification of variance components
Equations (4.3), and (4.5) suggest a step-wise approach for identifying the
components of (4.6). First, selection equation (4.2) is estimated by maximum
likelihood. Thereafter, the terms λˆsi and δˆsi are estimated. In the second step,
a within-individual model
ysti − y¯si = (xti − x¯si)β +
(
ϑsti − ϑ¯si
)
, (4.7)
where ϑsti = ψstεsti, and y¯si, x¯si and ϑ¯si denote individual means of the
corresponding variables, is estimated. Note that the selection bias terms λs
15The expressions for and δsi and λsi are derived in Bourguignon et al. (2007).
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are time-invariant, so they are incorporated in the fixed effects. Term ψ2st can
be solved from the variance of the residual terms (See Appendix for derivation).
Parameters αˆs, βˆ, and µˆs can be estimated from the between-individuals
model.
y¯si = αs + x¯β + µsλsi + wi. (4.8)
Residual term in (4.8) equals
wi = σsesi + ϑ¯si − µsλsi,
and by the inclusion of µsλsi into (4.8) its expectation is zero, which also
ensures that the estimate for αs is unbiased.
Variance of wi reads as
V ar [wi | Si = s, x¯ti, zi] = σ2sesi − µ2sδsi +
∑
t ψ
2
st
T
.
Replacing each parameter with their consistent estimate, and solving for σˆs,
gives a consistent estimate for the permanent earnings variance.
σˆ2s = ˆV ar [wi | Si = s, x¯ti, zi] + µ2s ˆ¯δs − ˆ¯ψ2s .
Each term in (4.6) is now identified:
τˆ2st = σˆ
2
s − µˆ2s + ψˆ2st.
4.4 Estimation results
4.4.1 First stage
The first stage of the model is estimated by a maximum likelihood multinomial
logit. Each of the multinomial logit models includes the following background
variables: gender, year of birth, parental education, socioeconomic status and
mother tongue dummies. Academic ability of individuals is measured by ma-
triculation examination grades from mathematics, mother tongue, the mean of
all examination grades and a dummy which indicates whether students have
completed a basic or an advanced syllabus in mathematics. In addition, the
selection model includes the instrument, which is the ratio of starting places to
applicants for each of the major choices. I estimate separate selection models
for men and women.
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Since the applicants-to-places ratio varies in time and across majors, the
data would also allow me to estimate a more flexible model where the effect of
applicants-to-places ratio would vary across major choices. Because of small
sample sizes in some majors, the coefficient on the ratio is indistinguishable
from the model where the coefficient of the ratios are restricted to be identical
between majors. I have therefore opted to use a simpler model where major
dummies are not interacted with applicants-to-places ratio, and is therefore
constant between majors.
The parameter estimates are reported in Table 4.3. Association between
the probability of graduating from arts and the grade in mother tongue are
positively associated with one another at conventional statistical significance
levels. Scoring high in the mathematics exam is associated with the probability
of graduating from medicine and engineering, and the general grade is statisti-
cally significantly positively associated with the probability of graduating from
business, arts, and law.
To facilitate the interpretation of the impact of the instrument on selection,
Table 4.4 reports the marginal effect of the places-to-applicants ratio on the
selection into different majors. The marginal effects are evaluated at major
means. A ten percent increase in the applicants-to-places ratio implies an
increase for the probability of graduating from a major between 13 percentage
(for engineering) and 2 percentage (for medicine) for men. The corresponding
marginal effects range between 24 percentage (for arts) and 2.7 percentage (for
law) for women.16
16It should be noted that since the coefficient on the instrument is restricted to be the
same across major choices, the variation shown in Table 4.3 is solely driven by the variation
in baseline probabilities of graduating from different majors.
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Table 4.3: Multinomial logit estimates of major choice
Men Women
General grade × Arts 0.322*** 0.178***
(0.065) (0.047)
Mother tongue grade × Arts 0.285*** 0.294***
(0.066) (0.056)
Advanced level exam in math × Arts 0.426* 0.637**
(0.217) (0.228)
Math grade × Arts 0.03 0.217***
(0.043) (0.029)
Advanced level exam in math × math grade × Law -0.34 -0.075
(0.061) (0.071)
General grade × Law 0.962*** 0.563***
(0.191) (0.177)
Mother tongue grade × Law 0.065 0.366***
(0.161) (0.174)
Advanced level exam in math × Law -0.042 1.495**
(0.593) (0.522)
Math grade × Law 0.010 0.292***
(0.089) (0.072)
Advanced level exam in math × math grade × Law -0.182 -0.027
(0.146) (0.140)
General grade × Business 0.449*** 0.369***
(0.096) (0.098)
Mother tongue grade × Business -0.017 0.089
(0.088) (0.099)
Advanced level exam in math × Business 0.312 1.505***
(0.320) (0.364)
Math grade × Business 0.152** 0.508***
(0.062) (0.052)
Advanced level exam in math × math grade × Business 0.022 0.223***
(0.078) (0.097)
General grade × Engineering 0.043 0.003
(0.064) (0.081)
Mother tongue grade × Engineering -0.021 0.112
(0.058) (0.086)
Advanced level exam in math × Engineering 0.279 1.262***
(0.251) (0.315)
Math grade × Engineering 0.145** 0.467***
(0.066) (0.056)
Advanced level exam in math imesmath grade × Engineering 0.632*** 0.641***
(0.053) (0.081)
General grade × Medicine 0.294* -0.021
(0.146) (0.083)
Mother tongue grade × Medicine 0.300** 0.222*
(0.136) (0.092)
Advanced level exam in math × Medicine 0.407 1.067***
(0.576) (0.336)
Math grade × Medicine 0.226. 0.332***
(0.121) (0.058)
Advanced level exam in math ×math grade × Medicine 0.309** 0.469***
(0.115) (0.089)
Ratio 0.609** 1.00***
(0.287) (0.290)
Notes: Omitted category is upper secondary school. Ratio is calculated as starting places divided by
number of applicants to each major. In addition to the variables reported, both models include controls
for regression specifications include controls for year of birth, first language, family socioeconomic status
and parental education dummies. Significance levels in both models: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and . 10%.
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Table 4.4: Marginal effects of the instrument.
Men Women
Arts 0.081** 0.242***
(0.038) (0.070)
Law 0.015** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.008)
Business 0.046** 0.077***
(0.022) (0.022)
Engineering 0.13** 0.118***
(0.061) (0.034)
Medicine 0.021** 0.081***
(0.010) (0.024)
Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at means of each major. Significance levels in both models: *** 0.1%,
** 1%, * 5% and . 10%.
4.4.2 Return to major estimates
I present the estimates based on the between individuals regression model
(Equation (4.8)) in this subsection. The results are given in Table 4.5.
Adding the estimated λs’s as regressors gives unbiased estimates for the
return to education estimates, but the estimated covariance matrix of the
estimates is biased because it disregards the sampling error in the generated
regressors. To correct for the extra sampling variability, I have resorted to
a block bootstrap procedure where 250 samples of size N are drawn with
replacement from the original population. For each bootstrap draw k, the
estimates αˆks ,βˆk and µˆks are calculated. Expected values and standard errors
of the parameters are calculated from the distribution of these bootstrap draws.
The first column of Table 4.5 reports the return estimates calculated from
a model without any controls. Second column in Table 4.5 reports the return
estimates with after controlling for x, and the third column reports the return
estimates controlling for x, and λs. Comparing the return estimates of the
first and the second and third column reveals that controlling for family back-
ground, matriculation examination grades and potential experience increases
the return estimates considerably. The effect of selection correction is much
smaller.
The Wald test for the joint significance of the correction function terms can
be interpreted as a test for the significance of the unobserved heterogeneity
over the entire sample. The p-value of 0.15 for suggests that the impact of
unobserved heterogeneity is rather inaccurately estimated in the male sample.
The corresponding value of p=0.08 for women is borderline significant.
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Selection correction increases the return estimates for all majors, but the
differences of corrected and uncorrected estimates are not statistically signifi-
cant, as evidenced by the Hausman test statistics reported in Table 4.5. This
is driven by the fact that selection correction inflates the standard errors of
the return estimates.
If the selection correction terms were not statistically significant, both OLS
and the selection corrected models would be unbiased, but OLS is more effi-
cient. Under the alternative hypothesis, OLS is biased, but the selection cor-
rected estimates are unbiased. The Wald test statistics reported in Table 4.5
are insignificant for males, and weakly significant for females.
There are considerable differences in the returns to majors.17 For both
sexes, the largest corrected return estimates are for health (169 log points for
men, and 129 log points for women). The smallest corrected return estimates
are for the arts degree, which are 104 log points for men, and 92 log points for
men.18 The return estimates are larger and earnings profiles steeper for males
than for females. A potential explanation for this is that fertility decisions of
women in their late 20s and early 30s cause longer breaks in their careers than
they do for men (see, e.g., Lundberg & Rose 2000).
4.4.3 Uncertainty estimates
This subsection discusses the uncertainty estimates related to each of the ma-
jors. The uncertainty is defined as the ex ante variance of earnings not cap-
tured by the observable characteristics or the correction function. Uncertainty
is further decomposed into two orthogonal components: permanent earnings
inequality and transitory shocks. The uncertainty estimates are presented in
Table 4.6.
I start by discussing the variance of transitory shocks which are reported
in the first row of Tables 4.6 A and B. Since the transitory shocks are time-
varying, I concentrate first on their time means. Comparing the leftmost
column in Tables 4.6 A and B to the others reveals that completing a university
17 Differences are significant at p < 0.05 significance level for both sexes and uncorrected
and corrected specifications.
18Though not discussed in detail, I have also experimented with a specification where
the potential experience terms are interacted with the major dummies to allow the income
trajectories vary between majors. I find that the interaction terms do not jointly statistically
significantly differ from one another, but the returns to major estimates are unrealistically
large.
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degree decreases transitory uncertainty considerably. The decrease is almost
four-fold for men and over two-fold for women. The differences between majors
are rather small and do not differ from one another at conventional risk levels.
Yearly transitory shock variances are plotted in Figure 4.2. The yearly
transitory shocks are particularly large for the year 1993. This is likely ex-
plained by the exceptionally deep recession which took place in Finland in the
early 1990’s. Further, the sample sizes for the years in the start of the sample
are very small.
Second rows in Tables 4.6 A and B report permanent earnings differences.
People with a university education face somewhat larger permanent earnings
differences compared to upper secondary school graduates, but the smaller
transitory shocks of the university graduates compensates for the increase in
permanent earnings differences. In total, university graduates face smaller
earnings uncertainty than upper secondary school graduates.
Among male university graduates, engineering graduates face 30 % smaller
permanent earnings differences in comparison to other major groups’ average
(p = 0.05). Among female graduates, no statistically significant differences
emerge.
Permanent earnings shocks are further decomposed into two parts: per-
manent earnings uncertainty and unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved het-
erogeneity is reported in row three of Tables 4.6 A and B. The estimates for
unobserved heterogeneity are inaccurately estimated and small – and nondis-
cernible from zero at conventioal significance levels. Shares of unobserved
heterogeneity in total uncertainty are visualized in Figure 4.3.
Transitory effect dominates permanent earnings differences for both gen-
ders and all education groups. This observation may be driven by the fact
that people in the data are in the beginning of their careers. Young people are
more likely to be engaged in job shopping and are less likely to be protected
by tenure. The finding that younger workers face larger transitory shocks than
older ones is a common finding from several developed countries. Nonetheless,
it is often the case that early career earnings shocks tend to evolve into perma-
nent earnings differences as people gather more work experience and are able
to secure their employment (see e.g., Baker & Solon, 2003).
Key empirical findings of this section are four. First, completing an uni-
versity degree decreases uncertainty regardless of major and gender. Second,
no differences between majors arise, with the exception of males who have
111
graduated from engineering. Third, the impact unobserved heterogeneity is
estimated to be economically small and statistically insignificant. Fourth, men
face larger income uncertainty than women.
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Figure 4.2: Yearly transitory shock variances by education categories. Majors
are classified as follows: 0: Upper secondary school graduate; 1: Arts, educa-
tion, social science; 2: Law; 3: Business; 4: Engineering and science and 5:
Health. 114
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Figure 4.3: The solid lines represent the total observed earnings variances for
men (black) and women (gray). The dashed lines represent the estimated
uncertainty. Education category 0 refers to no university education, and cat-
egories 1–5 refer to university majors. The majors are classified as follows:
1: Arts, education, social science; 2: Law; 3: Business; 4: Engineering and
science and 5: Health.
4.5 Conclusions
This paper studies returns to university majors, and the uncertainty related
to them in the presence of selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity. Us-
ing this model, residuals of an earnings regression are decomposed into two
types of earnings shocks: permanent earnings differences, and a yearly transi-
tory earnings shocks; and to an unobserved heterogeneity component, which
is known to the agent, but unobservable to the researcher. In addition to
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wages, measure of income used in this study includes transfers to people who
are not working. This gives a possibility also to include the unemployed in the
estimation allowing for a more complete picture of income uncertainty.
University majors are aggregated into five roughly similar categories. Lo-
cal differences in the supply of education measured by the starting places to
applicants ratio are used as instruments for selection into majors. Possible
bias due to self-selection is controlled by applying a multinomial selection cor-
rection model of Lee (1983), and an instrument based on local variation in the
selectivity of different majors.
Substantive results of this paper are summarized in Figure 4.4. The ef-
fect of completing an academic degree ranges between 104 and 169 for men
and between 92 and 129 log points for women over the earnings of an upper
secondary education. In addition to increasing expected returns, university
education also is found to decrease earnings uncertainty for both sexes. The
differences in the earnings uncertainty are found to be statistically significant
at 5% risk level, whereas the confidence intervals for the uncertainty estimates
of different majors overlap making them statistically indistinguishable from
one another.
Selection correction terms do not enter statistically significantly to either of
the models, which implies that the corrected and uncorrected returns estimates
are statistically indistinguishable from one another, and that the estimate for
the unobserved heterogeneity is very close to zero. This is likely partly due to
the small sample sizes in many of the majors, and broad set of control variables
utulised.
Notwithstanding the caveats related to small sample sizes, this paper con-
tributes another piece of evidence suggesting that (higher) education is a good
investment from the point of view of the individual. In addition to increasing
expected earnings, graduating from a university decreases earnings uncertainty.
This notion holds regardless of the major subject.
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Figure 4.4: Mean-variance plots. Notes: vertical and horizontal lines represent
95% confidence intervals for estimates.
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Appendix: Estimating ψˆ2st from the residuals of the
within-model
Equation 4.7:
ysti − y¯si = (xti − x¯i)β +
(
ϑsti − ϑ¯si
)
Assuming that observations are missing at random and that εst and εst−k
are independent for all k 6= 0, the residual variance can be written as
V ar
(
ϑsit − ϑ¯si
)
= Wst =
(
1− 2
T
)
ψ2st +
Ωsi
T 2i
,
where Ti is number of observation years of observation i and Ωsi =
∑Ti
t=1 ψ
2
st.
Summing both sides up over t gives
Ti∑
t=1
Wst =
(
1− 2
T
)
Ωsi +
Ωsi
T
and solving this for Ωsi gives
Ωsi =
∑Ti
t=1Wst(
1− 1
T
) .
Plugging this back to the expression of V ar
(
ϑsti − ϑ¯si
)
and solving for ψ2st
gives
ψ2st = Wst
Ti
Ti − 2 −
Ωst
Ti (Ti − 2) .
Finally, replacing Ti’s their sample average andWst with its consistent estimate
gives
ψˆ2st = Wˆst
T¯
T¯ − 2 −
Ωˆs
T¯
(
T¯ − 2) ,
where Ωˆs =
∑Ti
t=1 Wˆst(
1− 1
T¯
) .
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